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 Abstract. The sequelae of maltreatment are conceptualized according to the DSM IV multiaxial system 
expanded for heuristic purposes.  Axis I and Axis IV are expanded to take into account important variables of 
maltreatment. Differential Axis I diagnoses are identified with special emphasis placed on PTSD, Dissociation, 
Depression and Disruptive Behavior Disorders.  Axes II and III are heuristically expanded to call attention to 
developmental psychopathology, particularly in the domains of conscience, and associated putative neurobiological 
sequelae of maltreatment, indicating a pathway to the psychobiology of conscience. Conscience sensitive 
assessment of maltreated children is illustrated with two case vignettes and selected conscience drawings. A 
‘transaxial,’ conscience sensitive approach to DSM nosology is recommended as a corrective. There will likely be 
additional implications for the psychobiology of conscience as neuroimaging and assessment of conscience 
functions in health and psychopathology become more refined. Conscience Works: Theory and Research.1: 1-54, 
2001.  ℘
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INTRODUCTION      
   
Sequelae of maltreatment can be conceptualized in terms of the multiaxial system of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM). There are good reasons for doing so. First, developmental profiles have emerged with 
increasing specificity regarding the sequelae of various maltreatment experiences. Correlational studies have 
linked maltreatment to specific Axis I and Axis II diagnoses as well as associated biological findings which, 
depending upon eventual discoveries about their functional significance, may be candidates for Axis III. Second, 
the study of maltreatment is definitely a trans-disciplinary and, in its best form, an interdisciplinary enterprise. 
DSM is commonly accepted by medical, mental health, correctional and school professionals. Therefore, placing 
research findings regarding the sequelae of maltreatment within a multiaxial system provides common ground for 
professional understanding. Nonetheless DSM has been viewed by many in the aforementioned fields, including 
psychiatry, as inadequate to the task of providing a coherent nosology of conditions and disorders associated with 
maltreatment. Dissatisfaction may derive, for example, from a felt burden to use ‘the medical model’ in order to 
appease market or institutional pressures. Or it may derive from the problematic nature of categorical diagnoses 
applied to essentially dimensional phenomena, or it may derive from a larger concern with the dominant folk and 
academic psychiatry that makes it difficult to bring moral psychological description into the clinical picture. DSM 
is the classification we and those we serve are immersed in. Under the circumstances, it is important not to throw 
the baby out with the bath water. In the interest of providing as complete an account of this field of study as 
possible, in particular the possible consequences of maltreatment in the developmental domains of conscience, 
Axes I through IV are heuristically expanded as indicated in the text. In the last decade, the DSM made a 
transition from DSM III-R (APA, 1987) to DSM IV (APA, 1994). DSM IV will be utilized to conceptualize 
consequences of maltreatment; however, research studies cited were often based on DSM III-R. 
 
AXES I AND IV EXPANDED: VARIABLES OF MALTREATMENT 
  
In DSM III-R, Axis IV was used to encode psychosocial stressors as acute or enduring circumstances. In 
DSM IV, Problems Related to Abuse or Neglect are actually encoded on Axis I as 995 codes (when the focus of 
attention is on the victim), whereas Axis IV is reserved for psychosocial and environmental problems, no longer 
separated into acute and enduring circumstances and no longer rated for severity.  
However, the developmental implications of maltreatment are best appreciated if the clinician has also 
extracted from the history of present illness, the family history or the developmental history an account of the 
experience in terms of pertinent variables of maltreatment: age at onset, duration, frequency, and kind, 
relationship to perpetrator, severity as well as closely related protective and aggravating factors. One way a 
clinician might facilitate completion of this task is to devote a section of the psychiatric evaluation to “Adverse Life 
Experiences” in which the child is asked to chronicle bad things that have happened to her, and then to 
characterize them to the extent she is comfortable. Clinicians who are MD’s who may be engaged primarily in 
pharmaco-therapy of medicable target symptoms and who do not wish to make the child re-tell all the details of her 
experience, may preface this conversation with a statement of open-ness coupled with a statement of respect for the 
child’s autonomy in regulating her self-disclosure and an explanation of what is most important for the physician 
to know, along the lines of the model: 
 
“I want to listen to all that you have to tell me about your bad experience. I understand that, for now 
anyway, there are some things you may wish to keep to yourself or just between you and your therapist. 
Things very important for me to know as your doctor don’t require you to tell the whole story of what 
happened. But I do think it’s important for me to know ____ (specify the maltreatment variable of 
concern).”  
 
Many children who don’t want to talk about their experience in detail, for fear of re-entry, may be 
able to identify age at onset, duration, kind, relationship to perpetrator and often will even respond to 
the question,“ How has this experience affected (or changed) you?” -- perhaps for the first time 
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making explicit the attributions she makes or has made to the maltreatment experience. For examples 
of results from this approach, see the case vignettes p.35 ff. 
         Leaving in abeyance the technical difficulties with ascertainment of ‘what’ and ‘when’ and ‘how long’, the 
timing of maltreatment is still viewed by workers in the field as crucial in its implications for sequential 
development (Perry and Pollard, 1998). Age at onset may seem, on the face of things at least, the maltreatment 
variable easiest to characterize and the most objective. An example of work on this variable is an unpublished 
study conducted by investigators at Indiana University School of Medicine (Walsh, Kronenberger, Hu, Stilwell, 
and Galvin, unpublished manuscript; see below the section entitled “Conscience and Maltreatment”).1 However the 
maltreatment variable duration (and, presumably, frequency) combines with other variables to confound 
interpretation. Unremitting exposure to maltreatment conditions MAY be one among other variables of more 
significance than age at onset during a putatively sensitive period of development. Age at onset of maltreatment, as 
will be discussed in more detail further on, may also be associated with neurobiologic markers to which, 
hypothetically, are attributed psychobiological functional correlates.  
 If age at onset is roughly susceptible to characterization for some kinds of maltreatment, it is quite 
otherwise for other kinds of maltreatment (e.g. psychological or emotional neglect and abuse). Reportable 
maltreatment episodes lie at the extreme of this continuum which, in relatively subacute form, may yet dominate 
the child's day to day reality over time, producing effects at least as pernicious as the reportable episodes 
themselves. More enduring circumstances associated with maltreatment include fears of retaliation from the 
alleged perpetrator or of rejection from disbelieving family members for disclosure of the maltreatment. On the 
other hand, the severity of the maltreatment may be moderated or attenuated by positive aspects of the victim’s 
relationship to the perpetrator. Moreover there is apt to be a cascade of stressors associated with familial 
disruption once protective services are activated on behalf of the victim. Axis IV is serviceable for encoding 
stressors associated with "the continuum of caretaker casualty" (Sameroff and Chandler, 1975) such as rejection, 
harsh and inconsistent parenting or exposure to domestic violence and for the stressful sequelae of either ‘keeping 
the secret’ or disclosing it. 
  Taking “a transactional-ecological approach” (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1994), aggravating or potentiating 
factors can be conceptualized as familial, communal or societal. Potentiating family features include chronic 
poverty, domestic violence, unstable marital relationships, parental substance abuse and psychopathology, poor 
education, unemployment and parental history of maltreatment. Within the community, potentiators include high 
levels of violence and crime, poor schools and impoverished community resources while in the culture, potentiators 
include acceptance of violence and failure to sufficiently value the rights of children. These interact with other 
non-maltreatment variables including the influence of older and younger siblings, emotional identifications with 
family, class, and ethnic group (Kagan, 1998).2
 Severity is first of all influenced by an evolving sense of violation regarding the experience sustained 
(perhaps in repressed form) in long-term memory. Sense of violation is, like other terms appearing in these pages 
(for example: abuse, neglect, maltreatment, victim and even endure), ‘valuationally thick’ (more value laden than 
other terms), and apt to elicit moral reaction. Clinicians who strive to reduce their reliance upon valuationally thick 
terms because of concerns that these terms introduce bias into the assessment can nonetheless inquire about the 
moral meaning which the victim constructs from the experience. Of course, making any inquiry at all (that is, 
being at all curious about) a person’s maltreatment experiences already upholds a healing value in one’s interview 
technique: namely a conviction that acquiring personal information of this sort is important for understanding and 
treatment. The healing value (beneficence) justifies probing that is apt to inflict some pain. Conversely, to 
deliberately not inquire is an interview behavior possibly governed by a different valuation (dominated by, or 
  Relieving or protective factors may be found in the converse of 
potentiating factors. The potentiating factors in and of themselves are likely to have neurobiological sequelae 
mediated by interactive stress responsive systems still poorly understood in the developing child or adolescent. In 
fact potentiators and/or consequences of maltreatment may be identified in any of the problem areas encoded on 
Axis IV: primary support group, social environment, educational, occupational, housing, access to health care 
services and interaction with the legal system. Frequent exposure to urban violence and trauma constitutes another 
related enduring circumstance perhaps with similar sequelae.  
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rationalized according to, the healing value, non-malificence –“do no harm”) rather than some touted ‘value-
neutrality’.  
 Dr. Nancy Roeske, author, educator and child psychiatrist at Indiana University was fond of saying in 
supervision, “Every patient who comes to you has questions that may remain unspoken: first, ‘How ill am I?’ 
second, ‘Can anything be done about my illness?’ third, ‘Are you able to do what needs to be done?’ and fourth, 
“Why do you care?’ Add to these questions another about attribution: ‘Am I to blame?’ Add still other questions 
about perspective and negotiated meaning: in the first case vignette, the child asks in the course of the interview, 
“Do you consider it abuse if you are hit by something besides a hand and it leaves bruises?” is perhaps looking for 
consensual validation of her sense of violation that will pose an answer to the question ‘How severely was I 
mistreated?’  Moral meaning making or the construction of a moral worldview is directly related to 
conceptualization of conscience, which will be treated further on. Eisikovits (1998) proposes a constructivist 
theoretical model to conceptualize children’s experiences of interpersonal violence perpetrated by their fathers 
against their mothers. Four constructs used by children to come to terms with the experience are: living with a 
secret, living in conflict of loyalties, living in terror and fear, and living in an aggressive and dominance oriented 
context. As these meanings are derived from the experience of interpersonal violence they are said to be moralized. 
In Lost Boys, Garbarino (1998) poignantly highlights ten facts of life for violent boys. Five are explicitly attributed 
to trauma and each of these points to moralized meaning beyond the fact of life: child maltreatment leads to 
survival strategies that are often antisocial and/or self-destructive; the experience of early trauma leads boys to 
become hypersensitive to arousal in the face of threat and to respond to such threats by disconnecting emotionally 
or acting out aggressively; traumatized youth are likely to evidence an absence of future orientation; youth exposed 
to violence at home and in the community are likely to develop juvenile vigilantism, in which they do not trust an 
adult’s capacity and motivation to ensure safety and as a result believe they must take matters into their own hands; 
and traumatized youth who have experienced abandonment are likely to feel life is meaningless. 3
 Moral meaning making is seldom a solitary activity. The presence (or the lack), the emergence (or the 
loss) of someone perceived by the victim as caring and concerned are paramount among relational protective and 
aggravating factors. Caring and concern may take the form of moral reactivity to maltreatment itself and mobilize 
advocacy and prevention. Caring and concern may also be directed to the right and wrongdoing- the moral well 
being- of the victim. In response to this kind of care and concern, the victim may succeed in locating the 
‘Archimedean Point’ from which he can dislodge the old valuational framework and espy the makings of a new 
one. Such protective factors are, of course, readily discernible in the therapeutic as well as the adaptive context. 
The therapist, guided by the healing values of her profession, participates explicitly or tacitly in the deconstruction 
and reconstruction of moral meaning. For example, the therapist has a sense of violation shaped not only by her 
empathy but also by her general theory of mind, her specific ideas about developmentally critical or sensitive 
periods and by expectations regarding how the maltreatment experience is to be ‘re-framed’ (i.e. ‘valued 
differently’) in order for healing to occur.  Cultivating an awareness of conscience centered professional ethics, 
conscience sensitive interview techniques and a conscience sensitive approach to diagnosis make the healing values 
and the process of moral meaning making which those values guide, more transparent, more susceptible of 
communication to others and more apt to provide the foundation for conscience sensitive treatment planning. 
 
  Apart from its use for 995 codes, Axis I in DSM-IV retains the distinction of being the axis for major 
psychiatric disorders. On Axis I, one readily anticipates finding emotional, cognitive and behavioral sequelae of 
maltreatment-- provided the symptomatology is sufficiently extensive and severe as to warrant a categorical 
psychiatric diagnosis. Less obvious are symptoms reflecting valuational and volitional sequelae. In both folk and 
academic psychology, values and volitions have been encrypted in the broad categories of cognition and affect   
and surface only in fragmentary form among the diagnostic criteria. Some are more readily discernible from the 
standpoint of a heuristically expanded Axis II (see below). Table 1 represents recent studies that have associated 
Axis I diagnoses with some of the variables of maltreatment, explicitly character (i.e. sexual abuse, physical abuse 
and/or neglect), and implicitly, severity which, of all variables, is most difficult to assess. The Axis I diagnoses 
identified in Table I are discussed elsewhere in more detail (Ammerman & Galvin, 1998). 
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Table 1. 
 
                      AXIS I DIAGNOSES ATTRIBUTED TO  
             OR ASSOCIATED WITH MALTREATMENT 
 
AXIS I DX Comments on Maltreatment          
       Variables 
Reference 
Acute Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
  (PTSD) 
Recent and relatively circumscribed. 
(Compare Type I Trauma 
in Terr’s typology) 
Terr, 1991 
McCleer et al.,1998 
 Less often apparent on parents’ 
version of DICA than on child’s 
version among inpatients studied. 
Famularo et al., 1992 
 Sexual Abuse (SA) > 
Physical Abuse (PA) 
Pelcovitz et al., 1994 
Dissociative Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified 
 
 Coons, 1996 
Lewis & Yeager, 1994 
Lewis, 1996 
Dissociative Identity Disorder 
(Multiple Personality Disorder) 
SA plus PA Beitchman et al., 1992 
Affective Disorders More apparent on parents’ version 
DICA than on child’s version among 
inpatients studied 
Famularo, et al., 1992 
Attention Deficit Hyperactive 
Disorder (ADHD) 
Commonly diagnosed in both SA and 
PA victims 
McCleer et al., 1994 
Learning Disorders Intrinsic vulnerability and/or sequelae 
predispose to caregiver frustration. 
Lewis et al., 1988 
Communication Disorders  Largely unexplored. Allen & Oliver, 1982 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) 
 
 Famularo, et al., 1992 
Conduct Disorders  Rogeness et al., 1986 
                  Aggressiveness more often associated 
with PA. 
Runaway behavior more often with 
SA. 
Famularo et al., 1992 
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 More apparent on parents’ version 
DICA than on child’s version 
Famularo et al., 1992 
Substance Abuse Bi-directional causality: in some, may 
increase risk of SA, in others may be 
sequelae of maltreatment 
Hussey, 1996 
Eating Disorders Some evidence that women with 
bulimia without anorectic history have 
higher rate of childhood SA or PA 
Douzinas et al., 1994 
Psychosexual Disorder  Beitchman, et al., 1992 
 SA: more negative descriptions of 
human relationships and more 
preoccupations with sexuality 
Famularo, et al., 1992 
            
  
 Our own clinical experience mostly conforms to expectations based upon the aforementioned studies, 
however the last word has not been written on the association of PTSD with age at onset of maltreatment and, 
more particularly, when sexual abuse is contradistinguished from physical abuse.  In a pilot study of 25 females 
between the ages of 13 and 17 (mean age 15y9m), maltreatment experiences were ascertained and characterized 
utilizing an abuse/neglect screen adapted from Rogeness, Macedo, Harris, and Fisher (1986). Eighteen (72%) had 
been maltreated. In seventy-six percent of the subjects the maltreatment included sexual abuse at some time. 
Subjects were grouped according to age at onset of their earliest maltreatment experiences (early=before 72m; 
late=after 72m) and compared to a non-maltreated group of psychiatrically hospitalized females.  DSM III-R 
diagnoses were made by consensus at interdisciplinary diagnostic conferences and included consideration of results 
from routinely conducted structured diagnostic interviews (e.g. DICA). The most common Axis I diagnoses among 
maltreated subjects were PTSD and Major Depression. There were 13 diagnoses of PTSD in the early maltreated 
group (93%), 2 in the late group (29%) and no PTSD in the non-maltreated group (Adinamis, unpublished data 
from a study of consecutive admissions to an intermediate-stay adolescent inpatient psychiatric service).  
 PTSD is, in any event, an obvious consideration particularly if the maltreatment experience is recent and 
relatively circumscribed.  However in more enduring adverse circumstances, as is the case for emotional 
unavailability, neglect, rejection, hostility and intermittent violence fostering hypervigilance, stress responses may 
be transduced into chronic anxiety and depression without associated PTSD symptoms. A theoretical model 
describing the biological transduction of stress into depression has been articulated by Post (1992). An area for 
further research is to what extent early maltreatment experiences predispose towards PTSD following subsequent 
maltreatment experiences by processes similar to 'kindling.' Garbarino (1999) has developed this point most 
recently in Lost Boys. 
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Conduct Disorder Solitary Aggressive Type (CDSA), a DSM III-R diagnosis which corresponds roughly to 
Conduct Disorder, Childhood Onset in DSM IV, is an important sequela of maltreatment occurring most 
frequently in boys (Rogeness et al., 1986). The possibility of transduction of the stresses associated with 
maltreatment into CDSA will be discussed in the section on Axis III.  In a study (Galvin, Ten Eyck, Shekhar, 
Stilwell, Fineberg, Laite and Karwisch, 1995) of 50 psychiatrically hospitalized boys, ages 8.7-18.3y, mean 
age12.5y, fourteen (28%) were diagnosed with CDSA, 13 (26%) had other types of conduct disorder and 14 (28%) 
had Oppositional Defiant Disorder. Since these are mutually exclusive diagnostic categories 82% of the subjects 
had a disruptive behavior disorder other than ADHD (which can overlap with many diagnoses and which 17 of the 
boys were diagnosed as having). In contrast, PTSD and Major Depression were each diagnosed in only 8 (16%) of 
the boys although 36 (72%) had been maltreated.   Eleven (37%) who were maltreated early in life (before 72m) 
had CDSA vs. none who were maltreated later in life and 3 (21%) who were not maltreated. However, an 
association of age at onset of maltreatment and CDSA, while anticipated, was not confirmed statistically.   
 Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD), considered uncommon in prevalence does not appear in Table 1, 
but has maltreatment (either parental or societal) embedded in the diagnostic criteria “C” which requires evidence 
of pathogenic care in one of three forms. These are: C-1 persistent disregard of the child’s basic emotional needs 
for comfort, stimulation and affection, C-2 persistent disregard for the child’s basic physical needs or C-3 repeated 
changes of primary caregiver that prevent formation of stable attachments (APA, 1994). How often pathogenic care 
results in RAD is a question of considerable interest pertaining to vulnerability and apparent resilience (or, from a 
different perspective, undetected harm) as well as reversibility of maltreatment effects (Perry & Pollard, 1998; 
Kagan, 1998). 
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AXIS II EXPANDED 
  
                
    
 Axis II is where mental retardation and personality disorders or traits are encoded. Axis II sequelae of 
maltreatment include adverse effects on intellectual functioning. Maltreatment is also implicated in the 
pathogenesis of Borderline Personality Disorder (Famularo et al, 1992) and other personality disorders as well 
(Johnson, Cohen, Brown, Smailes, and Bernstein, 1999). A few unscientific observations (per author MG, based 
upon frequent engagement in reviews of aggregated referral information to a residential treatment center) of how 
Axis II is used today are: often it is not used at all or its use is deferred indefinitely. Many clinicians are 
conservative in the approach to diagnosis of a personality disorder in children- and rightfully so. Some clinicians 
will record traits but refrain from encoding disorder. When clinicians do record traits they are enjoined by DSM to 
record only maladaptive ones. However when it comes to constructing a treatment plan, not only maladaptive traits 
but also adaptive ones, the relative strengths and competencies (even if subject to developmental delay) are 
extremely important to draw into the account. An expansion of the scope of Axis II for heuristic purposes permits 
an appreciation of other sequelae of maltreatment identified in research in both development and developmental 
psychopathology.  
  Development is the story of an individual's progress in moving from less to more psychological 
integration and differentiation, utilizing the biologically based systems that govern cognitive functions, 
attachment, emotion, and learned behavior. Coordination of these systems in interaction with the environment 
allows a person to construct increasingly complex psychological meanings in living.  
 Cognitive functions. Construction of meaning requires that perceptions be tolerated, absorbed and 
organized. Integration of perceptions involves the ability to attend without extremes in affective arousal, to be 
optimally stimulated between a lower orienting threshold and an upper aversion threshold. When orienting, an 
infant turns toward a novel stimulus and suppresses bodily movement. Physiologically, orienting is accompanied 
by pupil dilation, brain wave desynchronization, increased galvanic skin response, suppression of respiratory 
frequency, decreased peripheral blood flow, and an initial slowing of the heart rate (Dawson, 1991; NOVA, 1985). 
These physiologic responses habituate with repeated exposure. At the upper threshold, overly intense stimuli elicit 
the aversive response characterized by heart rate acceleration and failure to habituate on repeated exposure. To the 
extent these thresholds are biologically determined, individuals may have an arousal/aversion range that typifies 
their ability to tolerate novel events throughout the lifespan. Meaning is contingent on memory systems that 
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undergird internal representational models. Malignant episodic memories are psychobiologically linked affective, 
cognitive and arousal functions in stable toxic configurations; they are central to the definition of PTSD (Terr, 
1988; Perry and Pollard, 1998). 
 Bowlby conceptualized attachment as a biological system with the proximal aim of providing a secure 
base from which the young may safely explore the world and a distal aim of preserving the species. Deficiencies 
and deviancies in caregiver attachment abilities have been causally linked to insecurity, social avoidance, social 
resistance and emotional/cognitive disorganization, as well as behavior outside the realm of societal acceptability 
(Magid and McKelvey, 1987). 
 Construction of meaning requires that emotion be recognized, given context and modulated. Izard (1977) 
recognized ten discrete emotions that serve as primary motivators in human development: interest, joy, surprise, 
distress, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, shame, and guilt (also see Nathanson, 1991 and Zahn-Waxler and 
Kochanska, 1989). Deficiencies and deviancies in emotional homeostasis are related not only to affective disorders 
but also to social relatedness. In the moral development of the child, deficiencies and deviancies may mean a moral 
emotional setpoint fails to acquire a "be good/feel good" setting. Learned behavior, requiring more exposition in 
the context of conscience, will be taken up in the next section. Cicchetti and Toth (1995) have reviewed the 
literature on sequelae of maltreatment in the developmental domains of language (particularly inner state 
language), cognition, emotion, and self-other differentiation. 
         
  CONSCIENCE: THE HEART OF THE PERSONALITY 
 
 The impression one has from available research is that maltreatment at an early age has the potential for 
altering the child's developmental trajectory both immediately and in ways that do not become apparent until stage 
salient developmental milestones are neared. Nowhere is this more apparent than in social cognitive, social 
emotional, valuational and volitional development which depends upon the interplay of temperament, secure 
attachment and autonomy. The domains of moral- that is to say, conscience- development as verified or suggested 
by our studies of children and adolescents (whose ages spanned 5 to 17yrs old) using the Stilwell (semistructured) 
Conscience Interview (SCI) are Conceptualization  (Stilwell & Galvin, 1985, Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta, 1991) Moral 
Emotional Responsiveness  (Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta, and Norton, 1994) Moral Attachment (Stilwell, Galvin, 
Kopta, Padgett and Holt, 1997), Valuation  (Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta and Padgett, 1996) and Moral Autonomy  
(Stilwell, Galvin, Kopta and Padgett, 1998).ξ
                     
ξ There are recent renderings of these studies in traditional book form for the general adult lay public (Stilwell, 
Galvin and Kopta, 2000) and freely available in electronically published book form for the middle school aged and 
older child at 
 See Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.medlib.iupui.edu/conscience/ Galvin and Stilwell, Ferraro, Gaffney, 1998). The 
interested reader is also encouraged to read Achieving Moral Health (Shelton, 2000) which offers sustained and 
academically informed reflections in combination with practical advice based upon a seven dimensional view of 
conscience. There are substantial overlaps of Shelton’s seven dimensions, which are derived from his general and 
clinical observations as well as his comprehensive view of the field of moral psychology, with the domains of 
conscience interpreted from semistructured interviews of children and adolescents. 
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Table 2. 
        DOMAINS OF CONSCIENCE 
 
Conceptualization of conscience (Stilwell, et al., 1991) measures the degree of inclusiveness and abstractness a 
person utilizes when providing a personal definition of conscience. Five transformations in conceptualization of 
conscience occur between the ages of 5 and 17. The most salient feature of each has been incorporated into the 
names of the stages: External Conscience (age 6 and under), Brain or Heart Conscience (ages 7- 11), Heart/Mind 
or Personified Conscience   (ages12-13), 
Confused Conscience (ages 14- 15), and 
Integrated Conscience (ages 16- 17). 
Stage transitions in the other domains are 
anchored in the domain of 
conceptualization of conscience. 
 
 Helpful Image: Think of five 
umbrellas of increasing size. Think of 
four panels visible to the viewer. Each 
panel represents a domain. The handle, 
stem, and supporting framework 
represent the conceptualization 
domain...the part that ties it all together.  
Illustration by Sandy Ferraro, courtesy 
I.U. Conscience Project 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moralization of attachment (Stilwell, et al, 1997) measures developmental transitions in the youngster's response 
to parental prohibitions and demands based upon how s/he links feelings of security, empathy and oughtness to 
child- parent and other child-authority figure relationships.     
 
Core concept: The Attachment-Empathy- 
Oughtness Link. In early childhood, a person 
develops a sense of oughtness out of his/her 
need for physical and psychological security. As 
the child learns emotional cues as well as 
identifying those emotions in the self, s/he 
gradually learns that 
compliance/noncompliance with parental 
prohibitions and demands is followed by parent 
pleasure/displeasure.  Mutual pleasure is the 
desirable state because it satisfies the bedrock 
value of connectedness. The link is formed.  
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Table 2 (cont’) 
 
Moral-emotional responsiveness (Stilwell et al., 
1994) measures developmental transitions in the way a 
child uses 1) anxiety and mood to regulate moral 
behavior and 2) processes of reparation and healing 
after wrongdoing to regain the physiological state 
normally experienced when feeling like a good person. 
 
 
 
 
 
Core concept: Moral emotional responsiveness is the  
barometer of the conscience. The barometer is  
established when the early oughtness experiences are  
linked to regulation of emotions and their  
physiological manifestations, Awareness of an  
‘am good--do good--feel good’ state becomes the set 
point of moral emotional harmony on the barometer.  
 
Moral valuation (Stilwell, et al., 1996) measures developmental changes in the way a child justifies compliance or 
non-compliance with rules of conscience based on both reasoning and psychological defenses. This domain has 
three subdomains based on how the child categorizes rules of conscience as authority- derived, self- derived and 
peer-derived.  
 
Imagery: Picture an infant lying helpless on the ground. 
S/he has to have connectedness with someone who will pick 
him/her up and care for him/her. S/he requires vocal and 
facial mirroring and soothing in order to express and 
regulate (harmonize) the storehouse of emotions s/he comes 
equipped with. S/he has to have a safe environment in 
which to explore and play (exercise autonomy) in order to 
make meaningful engagement with the world. Later, s/he 
has to have someone to communicate with to share what 
sense s/he is making of experiences (reflectiveness). 
   
Core concept: Basic psychological needs constitute bedrock values (italicized above). The child learns that she  
ought to behave in certain ways for these bedrock values to be met. As the brain matures, learned  
oughtness/behaviors become rules which in time, generalize to abstract values (e.g. trust, loyalty, justice, caring,  
tolerance). 
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Table 2 (cont’) 
 
 
Moral volition (Stilwell et al, 1998) measures developmental transitions in how a child uses his/her sense of 
autonomy in responding to and redefining rules of conscience. 
 
Core Concept: Autonomy and will allow a child to value being and 
doing as an individual. Autonomy and will become moralized as moral 
volition. The child gradually learns to make increasingly sophisticated 
judgement -derived choices about what s/he believes to be right or good. 
S/he combines what s/he has learned from others with his/her own 
moral intuitions, reasoning, defenses and risk-taking. Hard choices and 
courage are closely coordinated.   
 
  
 
  
 
 
Additional Conscience Drawings from Adolescents in Out-of–Home Placements. 
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 Our findings based upon semistructured interviewing of older children and adolescents are consonant with 
those of Kochanska, Padavich and Koenig (1996; also see Kochanska, 1991 and 1993) who have established a 
meaningful correspondence between younger children's narrative interpretations of hypothetical moral dilemmas 
and objective measures of their conscience functions. The "declarative knowledge" expressed in narrative form was 
associated with both past and contemporaneous "procedural" action tendencies and with maternal reports. 
Children's consciences were measured objectively at time 1 (ages 26 to 41 months), again at time 2 (43-56 
months), and by narrative at time 2. Although the age ranges were relatively restricted, there was evidence of 
cross-sectional developmental trends, as well as strong differences between time 1 and time 2, congruent with most 
theories depicting moral development as a gradual shift to more internalized regulation, growing empathy, and 
awareness of wrong-doing. Older preschoolers expressed more themes of empathy and guilt, more themes of 
confession/reparation, and fewer antisocial themes. Kochanska concludes that two developmental processes are 
important in conscience formation: the development of the tendency to experience affective discomfort, guilt and 
anxiety associated with wrong-doing and the development of behavioral control, the ability to inhibit a prohibited 
action (Kochanska, 1993). More recent contributions by Kochanska et al. to the study of conscience with respect to 
temperamental individual differences in effortful control have been among the subjects of a review of developing 
mechanisms of self-regulation (Posner and Rothbart, 2000). Self-regulation involves complex questions about the 
nature of volition (effortful control) and its relation to our genetic endowment and to social experience. Within 
cognitive psychology, the mechanisms thought to be involved in self-control are collectively called attention. 
Attention allows rapid changes in neural activity in local brain areas. Priority is produced, in the timeframe of 
milliseconds, by amplifying the amount of neural activity within the area performing the skill. When this is done 
voluntarily it is called effortful attention. Priming, in the timeframe of seconds or minutes, involves efficiently 
tuning the process in which automatic pathways are established, over minutes to days, by practice. Learning further 
involves the establishment of new connections stimulated by new associations over weeks, which eventuate, over 
additional weeks, in rule learning mediated by new structures, and, over years, development dependent upon more 
complex networks. Executive control is a second form of attention that emerges in the second year of life and is 
thought to involve the frontal midline (Posner & Rothbart, 2000). A psychobiological theoretical model of 
executive functions including response inhibition, nonverbal working memory, verbal working memory, self 
regulation of emotion and motivation, and reconstitution (e.g. processes of analysis and synthesis in self directed 
play) and the loci in the prefrontal regions that are implicated has been advanced (Barkley, 2000). 
  
 There is also at least partial convergence of the psychobiological interpretations drawn from the 
conscience study conducted by Stilwell et al. and ideas presented by Kagan (1998): 
 
  The human capacity for a moral motive and its associated 
emotions took from our primate ancestry a keen sensitivity to the voice, face, and actions of 
others but added five unique abilities:  
              (1) to infer the thoughts and feelings of others,  
              (2) to be self-aware 
   (3) to apply the categories of good and bad to events and to self,  
   (4) to reflect on past actions, and  
   (5) to know that a particular act could have been suppressed.  
The combination of these five talents created a novel system that first emerges in children in the 
second year and matures during the decade that follows… (p.169). 
 
Allowing for overlaps, there is remarkable correspondence among these five unique abilities characterized in the 
preceding excerpt on the one hand and, on the other hand, the domains of conscience drawn from children’s and 
adolescents own accounts and images in response to the SCI:  
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(1) to moralization of emotion  
(2) to conceptualization of conscience,  
(3) to moral valuation,  
(4) to conceptualization of conscience and moral valuation and  
(5) to moral volition.  
 
What does not appear among the “unique abilities” but is included, as essential among conscience domains is 
moralization of attachment.  
  
 As a first approximation, it may be said of conscience that it is a species and a refinement of 
consciousness.ℵ
                     
ℵ The terms “conscience” and “consciousness” are not infrequently confounded or treated as equivalents by respondents to the 
SCI. Initially this apparent confound was attributed to varying degrees, among children and adolescents, in their capacity for 
abstraction (along Piagetian cognitive developmental lines).In the context of the semi-structured interview, however, the 
respondent can be made aware that the interviewer is concerned to engage in dialogue about the part or parts of the person or 
personal processes that help him/her figure out right and wrong or good and bad, thereby avoiding misunderstanding. For the 
very young, even simpler language has been employed. As the interview was adapted for use in adults the confound nonetheless 
continued to emerge, albeit less frequently, in cases in which a high level of abstraction was evident. In particular interviewers 
were struck by the interchangeability of these terms in persons with origins in non-Western cultures. This has been noted by 
others as well. Damasio has made some highly interesting speculations about the lack of equivalently contradistinguished terms 
in some (for example Romance) languages and about the historical emergence and widespread use of “conscience” as a term 
long before the emergence and currency of the term “consciousness” (Damasio, 1999).   
Conscience is moral (-ized) consciousness. Hence what is generally discovered about the (neuro-) 
psychobiology of consciousness will be applicable to conscience as well. The model proposed by Damasio 
regarding the neural requirements for kinds of consciousness has at its foundation the non-conscious proto-self, a 
collection of interconnected and coherent but transient neural patterns representative of multiple dimensions of the 
organism’s current state (1999, pp. 154 and 174) . The proto-self as it is described appears to be more ‘neuro’ than 
‘psycho’ -biological; it is necessary but not sufficient for ‘the first person’ of psychological descriptions to emerge; 
in addition it is inaccessible to the kinds of consciousness it supports. With the emergence of “core-consciousness” 
the threshold is crossed. Core consciousness occurs when the brain represents how the organism’s own state is 
affected by the organism’s processing of an object and when this process enhances the image of the causative 
object, placing it in a spatial and temporal context. This requires second order neural patterns (1999, pp. 169 and 
179 ff). Sense of self and enhancement of the object arise out of cross regional integrations of neural activity at 
certain midline and phylogenetically older sites in the brain which are also involved in body regulation or 
representation and sites involved in the construction of the object (1999, p.270). “Extended consciousness” requires 
autobiographical self based on permanent but dispositional records which can be activated as neural patterns and 
turned into images (1999, pp. 174, 175, and 195 ff). Enter the possibility of conscience, which Damasio conceives 
as follows: 
 
  ….Among [the] remarkable collection of abilities allowed by  
  extended consciousness, two in particular deserve to be highlighted: 
first, the ability to rise above the dictates of advantage and disadvantage imposed by survival-
related dispositions and,  
second, the critical detection of discords that leads to a search for truth 
and a desire to build norms and ideals for behavior and for the analyses 
of facts. These two abilities are not only my best candidates for the pinnacle of human 
distinctiveness, but they are also those which permit  
the truly human function that is so perfectly captured by the single word conscience…. (1999, 
p.230) 
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Pertaining to the adult part of the lifespan, Cloninger and his colleagues (1993) have presented a 
psychobiological model of temperament and character. While this model is not restricted to adult moral functions 
or adult moral identity, it is strikingly compatible with the conscience domains Stilwell et al have described in 
children and adolescents.4 Cloninger et al’s current model identifies seven dimensions, the first four are 
dimensions of temperament, the latter three of character: novelty seeking, harm avoidance, reward dependence, 
persistence, self-directedness, cooperativeness, and self transcendence. 
  There is not a domain in Stilwell et al’s study of Conscience comparable to novelty seeking, however all 
of the domains of conscience seem to be established on the ground of Moral Engagement which sometimes lends 
itself to metaphoric (but perhaps not altogether metaphoric?) descriptions as appetitive or even passionate, for 
example as ‘thirst’ or ‘hunger’ or ‘craving’ for justice. Kagan (1998) has effectively articulated this idea in chapter 
three of Three Seductive Ideas:  
 
Although the content of every set of moral standards is tied to some time and place, the 
desire to believe that self is ethically worthy, like the ability to understand language is 
universal. Humans are the only species that applies a symbolic evaluation of good and bad to 
actions, thoughts, feelings and personal characteristics and tries continually to choose acts 
that make it easier to regard the self as good…. A moral motive and its attendant emotions 
are as obvious a product of biological evolution as digestion and respiration… (p.155). 
 
Phenomenologically, it may be important to distinguish moralized appetites from moralized emotions.  The 
conscience domain of Moral Emotional Responsiveness which has psychophysiologic, internal anxiety, external 
anxiety and mood components seems closely related to harm avoidance although it also includes reparation and 
healing-motivated by the psychophysiologic, anxious and emotional alterations in the be good/feel good setting on 
the moral emotional barometer. These are homeostatic regulatory mechanisms that control the internal milieu and, 
we speculate, probably rely upon very basic neural structures in brainstem and hypothalamus, under the influence 
of higher structures. Reward dependence is viewed as a heritable bias in the maintenance or continuation of 
ongoing behaviors and is manifest as sentimentality, social attachment and dependence on approval from others. 
The relationship to our domain of Moral Attachment is readily apparent although attachment, we think, does not 
reduce entirely to a temperamental dimension. This is not meant to imply that the capacity for attachment is not 
heritable. 
 In Cloninger's model, the three personality factors based on differences in self concepts are denoted as 
character dimensions. Self-directedness, the major determinate of the presence or absence of personality disorder, 
refers to self-determination and "willpower" or the ability of an individual to control, regulate, and adapt behavior 
to fit the situation in accord with individually chosen goals and values. Will is seen as a metaphorical abstract 
concept to describe the imaginal self as an integrated, purposeful whole individual, rather than a disorganized set 
of reactive impulses. There is prima facie correspondence of Self–directedness with our developmental domain 
Moral Volition and the closely related subdomain Self-derived Valuation, when these are brought together in a 
conceptualized organic unity. Cooperativeness, the impairment of which is associated with all categories of 
personality disorder, is the second character factor. Cooperative individuals are described as socially tolerant, 
empathic, helpful and compassionate.  We have associated these virtues with the Conscience domain Moral 
Emotional Responsiveness (Galvin & Stilwell, 1997) but there also seems to be a close relationship to the domain 
of Moral Attachment and the subdomains of Peer-derived and Authority -derived Valuation. brought together in a 
conceptualized organic unity. Cloninger's character factor Self Transcendence refers generally to identification 
with everything conceived as essential and consequential parts of a unified whole. While not necessarily a domain 
of spirituality, Conscience Conceptualization organically unifies and epigenetically transforms the supporting 
domains of conscience in a personally meaningful way. See Table 3. 
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Table 3. 
 
                          CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CONSCIENCE DOMAINS  
                                AND TEMPERAMENT & CHARACTER FACTORS 
 
   Cloninger et al.   Stilwell et al. 
 
 
  
   Novelty seeking    Moral Engagement  
 
   Harm avoidance                Moral Emotional Responsiveness  
 
   Reward dependence  Moral Attachment  
 
   Persistence    * 
 
   Self-directedness               Moral Volition, Self-derived Valuation   
 
   Cooperativeness   Moral Emotional Responsiveness,  
       Moral Attachment, Peer-derived and   
       Authority -derived Valuation. 
 
   Self Transcendence   Conceptualization   
 
  
          
   CONSCIENCE AND MALTREATMENT 
                
 Having described the state of the field of the study of conscience development in preschool, school age and 
adolescence and drawing comparisons with the study of personality in adulthood, we next examine the specific 
effects of maltreatment on conscience. That there are effects specific to the experience of maltreatment to oneself 
(or to someone close) is suggested by comparing the effects of other forms of adverse life experiences on conscience 
formation and functioning. In a study of victims of the 1988 earthquake in Armenia, it was found that adolescents 
in the city near the epicenter manifested advanced moral development compared to their counterparts in another 
less affected city. They nonetheless had elevated levels of psychopathological interference correlated with the 
severity of their post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms. The authors concluded that in the aftermath of a 
catastrophic natural disaster, children assume greater responsibilities and confront a multitude of morally 
challenging interpersonal situations, advancing their moral development. This advancement in development does 
not come without cost: there is pathologic interference with actual conscience functioning. The implication, 
however, is that the victims of natural catastrophe may be assisted to integrate the horror of their traumatic 
experiences and the harshness of post-trauma adversities into an adaptive schema of good and evil in themselves 
and the world (Goenjian, Stilwell, Steinberg, Fairbanks, Galvin, Karayan, Pynoos, 1999). Presumably, the meaning 
given by a child to adverse life events contributes to the substantiation and valuation of his/her identity and may be 
of utmost importance in furthering or hindering progress along his/her moral developmental trajectory.  
 Maltreated children have problems in peer relations especially regarding simple and complex equalities 
(Mueller & Silverman, 1989). In a study of 10 abused, 10 neglected, and 20 nonmaltreated preschool children it 
was found that the abused group was less likely than the comparison group to judge hypothetical behaviors with 
consequential hypothetical harm as impermissible (Smetana and Kelly, 1989). An investigation of aggression, 
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withdrawal and prosocial behavior in physically abused, non-abused but neglected and neither abused nor 
neglected children yielded the following results. Physically abused children displayed the most aggression, non-
abused but neglected children the most withdrawal and neither abused nor neglected children the most prosocial 
behavior. Only inclusion of all three dimensional variables discriminated the maltreatment groups fully in a 
multivariate analysis. The abused group became the most accurately classified only when the absence of prosocial 
behavior was taken into account.  
  
  
  
 Domains of conscience development affected by maltreatment have been investigated in youth in an 
intermediate length stay psychiatric hospital.  A sample of psychiatrically hospitalized boys was divided according 
to whether or not they had been maltreated before 36 months of age. Those who had suffered the earlier trauma 
were significantly more delayed in conscience development than those never maltreated or those enduring 
maltreatment only after that age.  Both emotionally disturbed groups were less proficient in conceptualizing their 
personal conscience and less sufficient in reporting self- and peer- derived rules they felt obligated to follow than 
their age and sex matched normal counterparts. Divided according to the presence or absence of early 
maltreatment, the emotionally disturbed boys were not significantly different from each other with regard to overall 
delay in conscience development.  However, boys maltreated early in life differed significantly from normal 
counterparts in being delayed in domains in which boys spared early maltreatment were not. Namely, the boys 
maltreated early in life had troubles: 
 
a) utilizing feelings of anxiety and mood to inhibit antisocial behavior,  
b) utilizing  reparation and healing to reinstate moral-emotional equilibrium after wrong-doing,  
c) perceiving  attachment figures as caring about and affirming their moral goodness,  
d) processing values related  to respecting and feeling protected by authorities, and  
e) developing skills and attitudes related to becoming a responsible person now and in the future.  
 
 With respect to psychopathological interference scores, which were made in addition to developmental 
scores, there were fewer differences between the hospitalized boys divided according to early maltreatment 
experiences. Again, those maltreated early had more psychopathological interference than normal counterparts in 
all domains. While those without early maltreatment had severe emotional disturbances requiring a level of 
intervention comparable to that required by the early maltreated boys, they nonetheless reported using reparative 
and healing measures as effectively as, and respecting their peers as much as, their normal counterparts did 
(Galvin, Stilwell, Shekhar, Kopta, and McKasson, 1997).  
 
 The SCI is an invaluable diagnostic as well as therapeutic tool to elicit moral meanings (for a detailed 
case report, see Ammerman and Galvin, 1998). On the other hand it is time-consuming both to conduct and to 
score.  Hence, it would be fortunate if clinical traces of conscience formation and functioning could be discerned in 
the specific items culled from familiar and widely used dimensional parent and child measures of psychopathologic 
interference. Clinicians could then utilize these as conscience sensitive critical items. Two widely used dimensional 
measures of psychopathology are the Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) for parents and the Achenbach 
Youth Self Report (YSR) for youth 11yrs or older (1985). 
 For purposes of study, specific items were culled from the CBCL and YSR a priori by, and required the 
agreement of, both senior authors (MG and BS) to be considered indicators of psychopathologic interference in the 
conscience domains. Two conscience domains appeared to be represented with face validity on the CBCL. The first 
one was Moral Valuation represented by two of its three sub-domains: authority-derived (9 items) peer-derived (7 
items). Only one item (#35) pertained to the third sub-domain, self-derived valuation (self worth). However an 
ambiguity (perhaps reflecting a general tendency in folk and academic psychology, to sometimes consider 
valuation affective in nature) had been introduced by use of the word ‘feels’ in this item. CBCL item #35 was 
therefore included among the items for Moral Emotional Responsiveness, the other conscience domain appearing 
to be represented on the CBCL (4 items). Conscience domains appearing to be represented on the YSR were also: 
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Authority derived Valuation (9 items), Peer–derived Valuation (5 items), and Moral Emotional Responsiveness (4 
items). In addition, on the YSR, adaptive, as opposed to psychopathologic, functioning in both conscience domains 
Moral Valuation and Moral Emotional Responsiveness appeared to be represented by 4 items, identified as Pro-
social (PS).  Although there were items pertaining to interference in more general developmental domains such as 
cognition, attachment, and autonomy on the CBCL and YSR, the domains of conscience derived from them 
through moralization: conscience conceptualization, moral attachment, and moral volition, did not appear to be 
specifically represented. See Table 4. 
  
Table 4.   
 
        PSYCHOPATHOLOGIC INTERFERENCE  
                   CONFIGURED BY CONSCIENCE DOMAINS 
 
              CONSCIENCE DOMAIN  CBCL ITEMS         YSR ITEMS 
 
 Moral Valuation 
   Authority: 22. Disobedient at home  22. I disobey my parents 
    23. Disobedient at school  23. I disobey at school 
    43. Lying or cheating  43. I lie or cheat 
    67. Runs away from home  67. I run away from home 
    72. Sets fires                72. I set fires 
    81. Steals at home               81. I steal at home 
    82. Steals outside the home  82. I steal from places other                         
      than home 
              101. Truancy, skips school               101. I cut classes or skip                               
                                                                                                                   school 
 
     Peer:   15. Cruel to animals  --- 
     16. Cruelty, bullying or 
           meanness to others  --- 
     37. Gets in many fights  37. I get in many fights 
     57. Physically attacks                     57. I physically attack people      
                                                                   people 
     97. Threatens people               97. I threaten to hurt people 
      
            
 Moral Emotional Responsiveness 
 
    26. Doesn’t seem to feel   26. I don’t feel guilty after  
          guilty after misbehaving                 doing something I shouldn’t 
    31. Fears he/she might do  31. I am afraid I might think  
                      something bad        or do something bad 
    35. Feels worthless or   35. I feel worthless or    
          inferior                                      inferior 
    52. Feels too guilty  52. I feel too guilty 
 
 
 Prosocial       15. I am pretty honest                 
        80. I stand up for my rights 
        98. I like to help others 
 22 
  
 
 The moralization of attachment, which gives rise to the security-empathy-oughtness link may, to some 
extent, be biologically constrained by sensitive periods of time in human development (Galvin et al., 1995, 1997, 
Kandel, 1983, 1985, 1998; McEwen, 1989, 1999; Perry & Pollard, 1998; Perry, 1998). During these periods, 
parental expectations of moral growth may not comport well with developmental realities. Parents may perceive 
the child as delayed in conscience formation and/or impaired in conscience functions, and may be subject to 
overvalued ideas, for example, that a particular moral emotion must be robustly evinced in order for the child to 
meet a conditio sine qua non for having a conscience. Such distortions may reverberate or viciously spiral as 
aggravating factors which predispose the child to harsher and harsher punishment. How do measures of 
psychopathologic interference vary (in the domains of conscience particularly) according to the age at which the 
adolescents completing their reports had endured childhood maltreatment? The specific working hypothesis was: 
 
Compared to other adolescent inpatients, those who endured maltreatment at earlier ages 
rate themselves as subject to more impairment in the domains of conscience functioning. 
 
 Pilot data was collected and analyzed at Indiana University Department of Psychiatry Riley Child and 
Adolescent Section (Walsh et al, unpublished manuscript). Subjects were 54 adolescents, male and female, 
consecutively admitted to a small acute psychiatric inpatient unit between 1991 and 1993. They were grouped 
according to age at onset of maltreatment:  
 
EARLY: on or before 36 months (N=19),  
MIDDLE: between 36 months and 72 months (N=6) 
              LATE: on or after 72 months (N=14), and  
              NONE (N= 15).  
 
These groups were comparable in age, gender ratio, and diagnostically (with the exception that PTSD was 
prevalent in the EARLY and MIDDLE groups but absent in the LATE and NONE groups). Neglect was more 
prevalent and the period of maltreatment was longer in the EARLY group. Physical Abuse and Sexual Abuse were 
not more prevalent in any particular group but, like Neglect, did have later ages of onset in the sequence 
EARLY<MIDDLE< LATE.  
 Scores on Achenbach CBCL and YSR broad bands, sub-scales and specific items rationally selected as 
indicators of perceived conscience functioning were compared. There were no significant group differences on the 
externalizing and internalizing broad band or sub-scales. There was a statistically significant difference among 
groups with respect to their mean scores of rank in each of the domains of conscience. Additional comparisons 
within the four groups demonstrated significant group differences in Authority-derived Valuation and Peer-derived 
Valuation but not Moral Emotional Responsiveness or Prosocial as characterized on CBCL and YSR. Examination 
of the descriptive statistics for the conscience domains suggested: 
 
i) Greater psychopathologic interference in authority derived valuation, reflected by the highest scores on 
items rationally selected from the YSR, was found in the EARLY and MIDDLE maltreatment groups 
ii) Greater psychopathologic interference in peer derived valuation was found in the EARLY maltreatment 
group with the exception that the LATE maltreatment group was more apt to engage in fighting 
iii) Greater psychopathologic interference in moral emotional responsiveness was found in the MIDDLE 
maltreatment group with the surprising exception that the NONE group scored itself higher than any 
maltreatment group on lack of guilt and lower than any maltreatment group on fear of doing something 
bad. 
 
On the Achenbach Prosocial items, the EARLY maltreated adolescents least strongly endorsed honesty and 
helpfulness, The MIDDLE maltreated adolescents least strongly endorsed standing up for their rights but most 
strongly endorsed being willing and liking to help others in need. The LATE maltreated adolescents most strongly 
endorsed standing up for their rights and the NONE group least strongly endorsed willingness to help others. 
Victim perceptions may well be at odds with the non-perpetrating (as well as perpetrating) parents' perceptions. 
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This perceptual discrepancy is by no means unique to the differential diagnosis of maltreatment as may be 
anticipated from Famularo et al.'s (1992) more general study which carefully notes the differences in diagnoses 
suggested by child vs. parent versions of the DICA. From the child’s point of view, being related to the perpetrator 
may contribute to a moral identity experienced in part or whole as deeply flawed and unworthy. How do agreement 
and congruence of measures of psychopathologic interference vary generally, and in the domains of conscience 
particularly, according to whether or not the parents completing their reports had engaged in childhood 
maltreatment? In the aforementioned pilot study (Walsh, et al, unpublished manuscript) the maltreated adolescents 
consecutively admitted to an acute psychiatric inpatient unit were also grouped according to whether or not the 
parent completing the Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist had engaged in child maltreatment. Of the 54, a total 
of 39 had endured maltreatment. In 7 of these 39 cases, the parents who had engaged in maltreatment completed 
the ratings for their adolescents. These 7 cases comprised the MALTREATING PARENT GROUP (MPG) and 
were compared to 32 cases that comprised the COMPARISON PARENT GROUP (CPG). Scores on Achenbach 
CBCL and YSR broad bands, sub-scales and specific items rationally selected as indicators of perceived conscience 
functioning were compared.  
The specific working hypotheses were: 
 
1) Compared to non-perpetrating parents, perpetrating parents perceive their maltreated children as subject to more 
externalizing and less internalizing psychopathological interference with adaptive functioning, 
2) Positive correlations between the non-perpetrating parent and child are more likely than that between the 
perpetrating parent and child on dimensional measures of psychopathology, 
3) Compared to non-perpetrating parents, perpetrating parents perceive their maltreated children as subject to more 
psychopathologic interference in the domains of conscience functioning 
  
 MPG and CPG were comparable in: their mean age (173 ±10 mos. and 176 ± 19 mos., respectively) and 
age range; male to female ratio (4:3 and 14:18, respectively) socioeconomic level as determined by father’s 
education and employment and the adolescent’s Medicaid status; prevalence of ADHD and the disruptive behavior 
disorders, PTSD, other anxiety and depression disorders as well as substance abuse; diagnostic density (# diagnoses 
per adolescent); the presence of physical abuse in the history, and number of kinds of maltreatment experiences. 
There were no significant group differences with respect to age at onset of sexual abuse or neglect or duration of 
maltreatment experiences. The entire group of subjects who were physically abused by their mothers endured the 
onset of maltreatment earlier in their lives than subjects physically abused by anyone else (p<0.02 by t test, p< 0.04 
by Wilcoxen 2 sample test).ℑ The ratios representing those adolescents who had endured maltreatment by one, two 
and more than two perpetrators were significantly different (p= 0.014 by Mann-Whitney test). In further 
exploration, subjects who had CBCL’s completed by their mothers were regrouped according to whether or not 
their mothers had engaged in the maltreatment. A significant difference did emerge with respect to age at onset of 
physical abuse. Among children rated by their mothers, those who had been maltreated by their mothers, alone or 
among other perpetrators were significantly younger (10mos± 11) at the age of onset of the maltreatment 
experience compared to those who were maltreated by non-maternal perpetrators (51mos. ±32; p=0.0157 by two-
tailed t test; p=0.04 by Wilcoxen 2 sample test). 
 Hypothesis 1 was not confirmed in this study. While the sample size was too small to draw any definitive 
conclusions, there were no significant group differences with respect to the CBCL broad band t scores or 
significant group effects, by two way ANOVAs, on the externalizing and internalizing sub-scales. Wilcoxen 2 
sample tests also demonstrated no group differences with respect to the externalizing and internalizing sub-scales. 
In addition it was not found that higher externalizing t and lower internalizing t scores distinguished MPG from 
CPG. 
 Hypothesis 2 was partially confirmed in this study. While there were positive correlations between reports 
of adolescents and parents who had not engaged in maltreatment, there were no positive correlations between 
reports of adolescents and the parents who had maltreated them.5
                     
ℑ The MPG and CPG groups also differed in this respect, but interpretation warranted caution due to limited frequency of 
observations in the MPG cell. 
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 Of particular interest, in spite of the small sample size, hypothesis 3 was supported by this study. There 
were statistically significant differences between groups with respect to mean scores of rank in the following 
domains of conscience (as characterized by parents): Authority-derived Valuation, Peer-derived Valuation and 
Moral Emotional Responsiveness).  
 Examination of the descriptive statistics for the conscience domains suggested that, compared to other 
parents of maltreated adolescents, parents who engaged in the maltreatment viewed their adolescents as subject to 
greater psychopathologic interference in:  
 
 
i) Authority-derived valuation reflected by more disobedience at school, running away from home, stealing 
at home and elsewhere, truancy and vandalism, but not disobedience at home or lying/cheating 
ii) Peer-derived valuation reflected by more cruelty, destructiveness and  engagement in fighting but being 
less likely to attack or threaten others  
iii) Moral emotional responsiveness reflected by being less likely to evince guilt after misbehaving, being less 
fearful that he or she might do something bad and having more feelings of worthlessness. 
 
 
 Fragmentation of moral meaning can be attributed to at least two factors. The first is extrinsic to the child: 
caregivers and clinicians may not have the means ready at hand to provide the child opportunities for framing 
moral meanings. The second factor is an intrinsic one: a person who has been maltreated early in life, constructs 
meanings of the maltreatment experience from fragmentary, implicit, scarcely retrievable, dissociated memories 
which nonetheless exert dire influences as her/his conscience works to make moral meanings. What meanings 
result? Clearly, a handful of items on a dimensional rating scale will not tell the whole tale (but do tell there is a 
tale to be told).  
 Psychological phenomena and their development are best discerned through a variety of approaches. 
Moral meanings represented richly are hard to come by in standard mental status evaluations of children. Semi-
structured interviews like the Stilwell Conscience Interview glean the fruits of personal meaning making, and 
enable the discovery of ‘the moral’, so to speak, of a child’s life story. Structured interviews demonstrate the 
reliability of measuring agreed upon features of the phenomenon of interest. Dimensional instruments add the 
feature of degree to measurement. Multiple informants add perspectives.  
 
 Clinicians are more or less accustomed to consider psychiatric diagnoses in a multiaxial but somewhat 
disconnected conceptual mode. Market and ideological forces sometimes do not reward or even actively discourage 
inclusion of 995 and V-codes on Axis I and a natural reluctance to encode Axis II diagnoses in children is shared 
by many clinicians. What may suffer is diagnostic coherence. Consider the following: 
 
  Axis I: Neglect of Child (Victim) 
             Physical Abuse of Child (Victim) 
             Suspected History of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,  
             Untreated 
             Parent –Child Relational Problem 
             Depression Not Otherwise Specified 
             History of Conduct Disorder, Adolescent Onset, resolved 
             Disruptive Behavior Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified 
 
 In this set of diagnoses, although confined to Axis I there is already a chronicle implied and, from the 
developmental psychopathological standpoint, a call to make that chronicle more explicit, in order to explain, to 
integrate and to conceptualize it. Too often in practice only ‘Depression Not Otherwise Specified’ will actually be 
encoded on the grounds it alone may warrant reimbursement.  
 In the light of the aforementioned heuristic expansion of Axis II, it is possible to have a fuller appreciation 
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of the trans-axial nature of psychopathology in maltreatment. Symptomatology weighing in favor of Axis 1 
diagnoses emerges from --and may become submerged again and undergo further transformations in-- 
developmental psychopathology. Conscience sensitive diagnosis makes for a fuller appreciation of this process.  
 Some Axis I diagnoses associated with maltreatment experiences (e.g. Depression, Conduct Disorder) rely 
upon criteria that correspond, straightforwardly, to delay and/or psychopathological interference in some 
developmental domains of conscience. In other diagnoses the compromised formation and functioning in 
conscience domains is encrypted in the criteria (e.g. Dissociation and PTSD). In particular, inferential work is 
required to appreciate the correspondence of DSM criteria to valuational and volitional domains of conscience.  
See Table 5. 
 
Table 5.  
  Sequelae of Maltreatment Conceptualized According to DSM-IV  
                                             Relating to Domains of Conscience 
 
Axis I  
 
Criterion  Relevant Conscience Domains 
Major Depressive Episode A - 7 feelings of worthlessness  
excessive guilt 
Self-derived valuation  
Moral-emotional responsiveness 
 A - 8    indecisiveness  Moral volition 
 A - 9 suicidal ideation Self-derived valuation 
Dysthymic Disorder B - 4   low self-esteem  Self-derived valuation 
 B - 5 difficulty making decisions Moral volition 
 B - 6 feelings of hopelessness  Moral valuation 
Dissociative Identity 
Disorder 
A 
 
 
B  
two or more distinct identities 
 
at least 2 of these identities recurrently 
takes control of the person’s behavior 
Conscience concept 
(Moral identity) 
Moral volition 
Conduct Disorder A repetitive and persistent pattern of 
behavior in which basic rights of others 
or major age appropriate societal 
norms and rules are violated 
Authority-derived valuation 
                 Peer-derived valuation 
PTSD C - 5  feeling of detachment                  Peer-derived valuation 
                      Moral attachment 
 C - 6 restricted range of affect        Moral emotional responsiveness 
 C - 7 sense of foreshortened future                 Self-derived valuation 
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Case Vignette #1:  
 
14 year old girl 
Residential Treatment Center 
Reason for Referral: “Because I have numerous runaway charges and I violated probation and I assaulted a girl.  
The probation officer thought a locked facility was best.”  The reason of record is that she is a client in need of a 
structured environment as she is ‘beyond her parents’ ability to control her’.  She has a history of runaway 
behavior and most recently ran from her group home.  She also has a history of verbal and physical aggression 
toward peers and staff. 
Chief Complaint: “I did go to a doctor for depression.  The doctor took me off the Paxil and put me on Celexa, a 
kissing cousin of Paxil.” 
Intellectual Functioning: WISC-III, Verbal IQ 87; Performance IQ 79, Full Scale IQ 81.  Her academic 
achievement scores by the WIAT were below predictions based on her cognitive abilities.   
On her Youth Self Report, she has a total T score 72, Internalizing T 68, Externalizing T 75.   
 
DSM IV: 
Axis I: Victim of Sexual Abuse and Possibly of Neglect, perceiving her mother as being emotionally negligent and 
allegedly physically abusive.  She has some symptoms of PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder. Substance Abuse, 
principally Cannabis.  Rule Out Bi-Polar Disorder. At one point, she was thought perhaps to have Attention Deficit 
Hyperactive Disorder.   
Axis V: Current GAF: 45-50 
 
Adverse Life Experiences: 
 
She indicates that when she was little, her mother was not there for her.  She later indicates that her mother left the 
family when she was nine, leaving a four page letter.  She says that her mother neglected her educational needs 
and gives examples that her mother would promise to come to school activities and not show.  She went to live 
with her dad for a period of time.  She returned to live with her mother, getting her father’s permission to do so, 
and then she went to a group home because she “could not stay” with her mother, she would just run away.  She 
denies having observed domestic violence but does recall her parents yelling at one another.  She says, “I basically 
took care of myself.  My dad tried really hard but he couldn’t handle me.” Referring to her mother as well as her 
resolve to do better by her own children, she says, “You can’t mess up a child’s life because it reflects on them 
when they get older.”  At ten years of age she experienced a rape by her uncle.  In the course of it he made threats 
against her life. He was not charged with rape. Instead, she decries, “The case was treated as a molest.” She 
conveys the information, with some perplexity and indignation, that her uncle was an alcoholic but managed to do 
whatever he wanted. Asked about other experiences of physical abuse, she queries back, “Is it considered abuse if 
you are hit by something besides a hand and it leaves bruises?  Mom would use pieces of wood or a belt or would 
have her boyfriend hold me and she would whip me leaving bruises and welts. Once she used a fireplace shovel on 
me.”  Nonetheless, she never received medical attention.  She says that her bruises were “just treated with ice.”  
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Conscience Functioning: 
   
Conceptualization:  She has heard of the word conscience. 
 She likens it to a voice in her head telling her she 
shouldn’t do this or in case she does something [she 
shouldn’t] that she will get into trouble.  She says “But I 
never listen to it. I don’t hear it that often.”  She was 
recently made aware of her conscience when she was out 
late past curfew and a police car came by.  She told herself, 
“I’m busted.”   
Moral Attachment: The first good thing that she can 
remember doing was receiving a tribute from father when 
he told her she was nice.  She believed (and believes) his 
sincerity.  She says that when her mother praises her, it 
does not make her feel better.  She associates her mother 
with making the statement “You disappointed me a lot.” 
The first bad thing she can remember doing was being 
underneath the car with her brother when she was six. He showed her how to smoke a cigarette. They were caught 
by her mother who disapproved.  She recalls having been caught by her mother again when she was seven. That 
time, she and her brother were made to smoke cigars until they became dizzy and then were whipped with part of a 
cutting board. 
Moral Emotional Responsiveness: She can experience her own conscience “busting her” without police coming 
by. She says whenever she yells at somebody who does not deserve it, she feels badly afterwards.  She localizes this 
bad feeling to her head.  She says that apologies and the hope of forgiveness may make her feel better.  If she is 
forgiven, “it’s good”, if not, she feels worse.  Asked if she has had the experience of unforgiveness, she said that 
she has experienced lack of forgiveness from her mother. She associates the condition of unforgiveness with 
getting into an altercation with her mother, being hit by her mother and hitting her mother in return.  She says, “I 
body slammed her and she’s still afraid of me.”   
When she has done something good and nobody knows about it, she harbors the thought “See they don’t care.  
There is no point to doing this.”  When she has done something bad and nobody knows about it, she characterizes 
her inner states as: “Ha Ha, they didn’t catch me.  That’s their problem, not mine.”   
Moral Valuation: When asked if she has any rules to live by, she says if she made up her own rules, she would 
stay out until 10:30, go to school but on her own time, get a job, live on her own and eat what she wants.  She puts 
a premium on independence.  She says, “I value that more than anything else that you’ve written down.”  She sees 
herself as putting herself down a lot, as being subject to self-devaluation. 
Moral Volition: She says, “When I take responsibility my mom doesn’t like it, and when I don’t take 
responsibility she still doesn’t like it.  She tries to be the boss of me-- doesn’t realize I’ve taken care of myself.”  
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Case Vignette #2: 
     
13 year old boy 
Residential Treatment center 
Reason for Referral: 
His understanding: is that “I was molesting my cousins.”   
On record: he is a child in need of a sexual offender program. 
Chief Complaint: “I miss home.” 
Intellectual Functioning: IQ of 113 in the referral information.  There is no  
information on what instrument was used for obtaining this IQ. 
 
Adverse life experiences 
He counts as a major adversity not being able to see his grandmother.  The reasons for this prohibition are not fully 
given.  He says that his grandmother did not think that he needed to come to the Residential Treatment Center.  
Grandmother apparently disputed with his mother about this and also talked with his father, such that his mother 
believed that grandmother would interfere with his treatment.  He says that his parents divorced when he was two 
or three and he does not think that was a good thing.  He is aware that his mother was subjected to alleged 
domestic violence before he was born but he does not recall any while he was with his biological parents.  He is 
aware that his mother has had “some difficulties with men” since then.   
 
DSM IV:
Conceptualization:  He has heard of the word conscience 
and, with a small smile, says “a little voice to tell you what to 
do.”  He denies he has one now but allows that he may have 
had one once, he cannot say when. The conscience is “a part 
of your brain and your brain is a tangled mess-- so I don’t 
know.” 
 Axis I: 1) Sexual Abuse of Children as Perpetrator;  
2) Probable Conduct Disorder; Possible Substance Abuse;  
              3) History of ADHD 
   Axis V: Current GAF: 35-40 
 
 
 
 Conscience Functioning: 
   
 Moral Attachment: When asked about the first thing he 
could remember doing that was good, he replies “nothing.” 
Despite urging, he retrieves no memory of approval.  When 
asked about the first thing that he did that was wrong, he 
needs no prompting and says, “lots of things” but 
spontaneously specifies “molesting.”  He perceives his 
grandmother as caring most about whether he is good or bad 
but is unable to identify how she shows her concern. Still she is “the only one” who appreciates when he does good 
things. 
Moral Emotional Responsiveness: He says when he has done something good, “it does not matter.”  When he has 
done something bad and nobody knows about it, nothing particular happens inside him; however, if someone does 
know about it, he says, “I wish I wouldn’t have done it.” 
Moral Valuation: Asked about Do’s and Don’ts in his life, he says, “I don’t have any.”  Nonetheless, he is able to 
identify that he values his grandmother.  He is unable to identify any behaviors that he practices to uphold the 
value of this relationship. 
“Conscience 
is part of 
your brain 
and your 
brain is a 
tangled mess-
so I don’t 
know.” 
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Moral Volition: He is aware of a time when he decided not to do something wrong that he thought he might want 
to do.  He decided not to smoke weed.  He said “No” because he did not want to but adds that he did not want to get 
caught.  He is aware of thinking consequentially prior to engaging in the molestation but decided in favor of the 
urge even at the risk of being caught. 
 
In the case vignettes, one of victim, one of perpetrator (whose victimization must be inferred), Axis I and 
V have been deliberately isolated and juxtaposed against adverse life experiences from the youth’s point of view, 
and the responses to questions regarding conscience. While the examination of conscience may seem too time 
consuming to implement routinely as part of clinical assessment, these case vignettes attest to the contrary. Each 
has been extracted from a complete psychiatric evaluation based upon interviews conducted routinely in a 1.5 hour 
timeframe for clinical -- not research --purposes. The inclusion of these questions allows for a more meaningful 
mental status evaluation. Indeed, current practice parameters for psychiatric assessment of children and 
adolescents specify that “conscience and values” should be assessed: conscience specifically in terms of “age 
appropriate development, specific areas of harshness, laxness, or conflict; effectiveness in helping child conform to 
expected family and community norms.” (AACAP, 1997) 
 
Additional Conscience Images of Maltreated Children 
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•The first three drawings are similar in some respects to the drawings collected from advantaged children. 
The artists make use of two pages or a division of a single page to concretely depict examples of good and bad, 
right and wrong. This is consistent with the externalized conscience represented by advantaged children having a 
modal age of six. However the persons of conscience who have rendered their images here are not children. They 
are adolescents. This suggests delay in the development of conscience concept.  
•The next general point to note is that the contents of these drawings may include representations of age 
expectable issues and preoccupations; for example the use and abuse of vehicles and substances. However, they also 
have content that varies markedly from those of the advantaged children, none of whom represented their 
experience of wrongdoing in any way comparable to “doing cars,” or with an aggregate of gang symbol, hand-gun 
and blunt. Nor did they represent right-doing as “me living with my kid.”  
•Particularly poignant is an image rendered by a 15-year-old boy whose conscience positions him between 
a detention center and a mosque.  
•Angels and devils seem as commonplace in the conscience imagery of maltreated adolescents as they are 
in drawings from advantaged adolescent and younger children but it may be noted that in the last of these three 
drawings the angel is conspicuously absent.  Conscience is identified as telling the youth to do bad things.  
•The use of a divided paper to depict good and bad conscience persists in the conscience imagery of some 
maltreated adolescents and may be related to the dynamism of splitting. Note the reliance of one youngster upon 
external goods (more aesthetically than morally valuable) to bolster a fragile sense of well-being. In another case, 
her mindfulness of good and bad days in life is represented as passive rather than agentic. 
• The final two illustrations are images rendered by sexually reactive adolescent boys. Use of the Stilwell 
Conscience Interview and Imagery may assist both in assessment and in attaining treatment goals relevant to 
victim awareness and empathy, values clarification and impulse inhibition (AACAP, 1999).   
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AXIS III EXPANDED:                   
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY  
     
 
 Axis III is where physical conditions related to the other axes are encoded. Axis III has obvious utility for 
recording sequelae of battering and sexual molestation such as can be discerned by physical examination and 
available laboratory, x-ray or neuroimaging studies that may be clinically indicated. Failure to thrive or, in extreme 
cases, the marasmic effects of child neglect could be recorded here.  However Axis III also may be appropriated for 
heuristic purposes to call attention to putative neurobiologic, hormonal, and immunologic sequelae of maltreatment 
which may or may not have functional significance and may or may not correlate with the psychiatric and 
developmental sequelae encoded on Axis I and II, respectively and/or in a more direct way with the variables 
related to maltreatment on Axis IV. On Axis III expanded for heuristic purposes, we conceptualize heritable 
biological factors underlying temperament and biological factors underlying adaptive/maladaptive, 
adverse/nonadverse learning necessary for character formation. The hierarchical principles involved in the 
complex mental processes underlying construction of meaning parallel the evolutionary development of brain 
functioning. A review of developmental neurobiologic studies across the animal kingdom (e.g. Benes, 1991) is akin 
to watching a staged theatrical performance in which precisely timed developmental events orchestrated by 
genetically determined programs and cell-cell interactions form dramatic movement across the stage. Tragic 
interferences in anatomical development occur when genetic defects or environmental insults mar the process 
during the period of neurogenesis (the first trimester in humans), causing gross teratogenic or structural defects in 
brain development. Later appearing genetically expressed disturbances or environmental insults are more likely to 
affect neuronal connections in the brain, producing subtler defects (Coyle, 1987). 
 Epigenetic, environmental modulation of genetic factors facilitates development of the central nervous 
system, resulting in neurite outgrowth, neurite pruning, synaptogenesis and synapse withdrawal (Leckman, 1991). 
While most of these processes are thought to be preprogrammed and uninfluenced by anything other than highly 
adverse and physical environmental experiences, it has been suggested that only a fifth of the brain's neurons are 
genetically preprogrammed, leaving the remainder as areas of flexibility upon which experience can work, forming 
the basis of learning (Werry, 1991). 
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 Environmental influences on the brain and, therefore, on learning are inversely related to age (Kandel, 
1985). Three ontogenetic stages of synapse modification are suggested. The first stage, synapse formation, is under 
genetic and developmental control. The second stage, fine tuning of newly developed synapses, is under the control 
of appropriate and timely patterns of environmental stimulation. The third stage, regulation of transient and 
long-term effectiveness of synapses, occurs throughout later life and is determined by day to day experiences. 
 In an overview of the field of developmental psychopathology provided by Emde and Spicer, particulars, 
variations and unique aspects of experience are examined in the context of meaning. Incorporated in the changing 
view of early development are three currents: advances in knowledge of genetics and the changing brain, 
awareness of the complexity of early emotional development and increasing appreciation for the diversity of early 
experience in cultures of the world. There is bi-directionality between brain and behavior. Elaborating upon 
Kandel’s work, the authors note that some synaptogenesis is experience expectant, such that the expected 
experience generates predictable patterns of neural activity making it possible for certain synaptic connections to be 
selected for preservation with time–limited plasticity. Other synaptogenesis is experience –dependent allowing 
plasticity in responding to specific features of the environment. Human emotions are not reactive, intermittent, 
disruptive states. Instead they are complex, active, ongoing and organized processes that serve adaptive purposes. 
Adverse experiences with attachment figures are associated with emotional dysregulation and behavioral problems. 
Experiences of developing children are shaped in powerful ways by individuals in transaction with the systems of 
meaning that are at the center of contemporary anthropological definitions of culture. Developmental experiences 
in turn shape cultural meanings (Emde and Spicer, 2000). It would be a serious omission in the account of 
development to overlook the role of the internally constructed ‘environment’ termed ‘conscience’ in its reciprocally 
dynamic relationship to genetic, social and cultural influences. 
 Incorporating the concepts of ontogeny and biological learning into the definition of developmental 
psychopathology, development expresses the maximal evolutionary potential for learning while psychopathology 
defines specific phenomena that interfere with the realization of that potential. Maladaptive learning is particularly 
implicated in the development and perpetuation of psychopathologic syndromes associated with extreme stress. 
 
  A HERITABLE TRAIT FOR CONSCIENCE FORMATION? 
  
 In a classic version of the social learning approach moral inhibitions are conceptualized as 
conditioned avoidance responses. Because they have been punished for wrongdoing in the past and experienced 
aversive emotions, children come to experience anxious arousal even in the absence of the socializing agent  
(Kochanska, 1993). Mowrer (1966,1974 reviewed by Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990, and  by Gorenstein & 
Newman, 1980, respectively) identified common concepts in psychoanalytic and learning theory by linking the 
concept of anxiety with conditioned fear and the notion that behaviors associated with the termination or reduction 
of anxiety are reinforced. The execution of a deviant act involves a sequence of response-produced cues, each 
providing sensory feedback. Punishment may occur at various points in the sequence and so lead to the relatively 
direct association of a fear response with the response produced cues occurring at the time of punishment. If 
punishment occurs following transgression, fear will be associated with stimuli accompanying the deviant act. If 
punishment occurs earlier, it should be associated with the preparatory responses and the emotion of fear and 
should be more effective in preventing deviation (Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1988). Mednick and Hutchings 
developed a different two factor theory for the psychopath's avoidance deficit. They cited low skin conductance 
recovery rate, which suggested delayed reduction of anxiety such that the inhibition was not strongly reinforced 
(Gorenstein & Newman, 1980).6      
 In a chapter entitled The Biosocial Basis of Learning Morality, Mednick proposed that the operation of 
the genetic influence in criminality could be relatively nonspecific (e.g. general intelligence) or could be via some 
physiological predisposing factor or factors, or both. He constructed a theory that specifies an autonomic variable 
which seems heritable and which could conceivably play some role in the etiology of antisocial behavior. 
 
  How do children learn to inhibit aggressive impulses?  
  Child A is aggressive to Child B  
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  Child A is punished by a censuring agent (parent, teacher, peer) 
  Child A contemplates aggressive action to another child 
  Child A acquires anticipatory fear of punishment 
  Child A inhibits the aggressive impulse  
  Child A's anticipatory fear dissipates. 
 The reduction of Child A's fear is a powerful, naturally occurring reinforcement for inhibition of 
aggression. In order to learn morality the child needs:  
  1) A censuring agent (typically family) AND 
  2) An adequate fear response AND 
  3) The ability to learn the fear response in anticipation of an asocial act AND 
  4) Fast dissipation of fear to quickly reinforce the inhibitory response. 
The Fear Response is controlled by the ANS. Indicants are heart rate, blood pressure and skin conductance 
(Mednick, 1981). 7 
 
 Cadoret et al. (1995) reported on an adopted away study of 95 males and 102 females, 18-42 yrs old at the 
Raine and Venables (1984, cited by Quay) found a significant negative correlation between ratings of 
antisocial behavior and galvanic skin response (GSR) amplitudes. Delamater and Lahey (1983 cited by Quay) also 
demonstrated lower skin conductance levels during a continuous performance task for preadolescents rated high on 
conduct problems using the Conners Teachers Rating Scale. Schmidt (1985, cited by Quay) found a lower GSR 
responsivity to a loud bell in the Conduct Disorder group compared to normals. Many of these results are 
consistent with a framework described by Gray and elaborated by Fowles in which behavior is under the control of 
a Behavioral Inhibition System indexed by GSR and a reward system indexed by heart rate (Quay, 1987). Fowles 
(1987, 1994) provided an overview of the state of this field, concluding (1987) that a series of studies had shown 
that heart rate might be significantly influenced by appetitive motivation such as performance -contingent 
monetary incentives during performance of a continuous motor task but did not respond to aversive stimulation in 
the form of feedback failure. Conversely, nonspecific skin conductance fluctuations did respond to aversive 
stimulation. 
 A putative temperamental factor conferring resistance to the development of conduct disorder has been 
variously termed: “inner tension,” (Dienstbier, reviewed by Zahn-Waxler and Kochanska, 1989; Zahn-Waxler, 
Klimes-Douglas, Slattery, 2000) or “body dysphoria” (Kagan, 1998, p.180) are two examples. It is seen as 
disposing a person to self-examination. Generally not given full consideration is the possibility that the genetic 
expression of this temperamental factor is susceptible to adverse environmental modulation which, in extremis, 
may result in a disconnection with emerging conscience functions.  
 
 Conduct Disorder, like Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), is generally seen as having both heritable 
and environmental etiologic factors. Lyon et al. (1995) compared DSM-III R antisocial personality symptoms 
before 15 years of age vs. after 15 years of age. This was a twin study of 3226 pairs of male twins from the 
Vietnam Era Twin Registry. They were interviewed by telephone using the DIS Version III.  Biometrical modeling 
was applied to each symptom of antisocial personality disorder and summary measures of juvenile and adult 
symptoms. They found five of twelve juvenile symptoms were significantly heritable, five others were significantly 
influenced by shared environment. In contrast eight of ten adult symptoms were significantly heritable and the 
shared environment influenced one. Shared environment explained about six times more variance in juvenile 
antisocial traits than in adult traits. Shared environmental influences on adult antisocial traits overlapped entirely 
with those on juvenile traits. Additive genetic factors explained about six times more variance in adult vs. juvenile 
traits. The juvenile genetic determinants overlapped completely with genetic influences on adult traits. The unique 
environment explained the largest proportion of variance in both juvenile and adult antisocial traits. They 
concluded that characteristics of the shared or family environment that promoted antisocial behavior during 
childhood and early adolescence also promoted later antisocial behavior, but to a much lesser extent. Genetic 
causal factors were much more prominent for adults than for juvenile antisocial traits. The investigators assumed 
that the behaviors described in DSM reflected a latent trait that influenced probabilistically the likelihood of 
carrying out certain behaviors. They hypothesized characteristics such as sensation seeking and impulsivity that 
would mediate between genes and observable antisocial behavior.  
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time of the study, separated from birth from biologic parents with documented (by prison and hospital records) 
APD and their adoptive parents undertaken to determine the effect of an adverse adoptive home environment on 
adoptee conduct disorder, adult antisocial behavior and two measures of aggressivity. Using multiple regression 
analysis they showed 1) a biologic background of antisocial personality disorder predicted increased adolescent 
aggressivity, conduct disorder and adult antisocial behaviors and 2) adverse adoptive home environment (marital 
problems, divorce, separation, anxiety conditions, depression, substance abuse or dependence or legal problems) 
independently predicted increased antisocial behavior. Interactive effects resulted in increased aggressivity and 
conduct disorder in adoptees in the presence but not in the absence of a biologic background of antisocial behavior. 
They concluded that environmental effects and genetic environmental interaction accounted for significant 
variability in adoptee aggressivity, conduct disorder and adult antisocial behavior.        
 To explain Conduct Disorder appeals have been made to Quay’s elaboration of Gray's hypothesis 
(Rogeness, Javors & Pliszka, 1992, also see: Quay, 1993, Rogeness, 1994). In brief, primary brain systems are 
identified. These include the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), and the Reward or Behavioral Facilitatory 
System (BFS).  The BIS acts as a comparator and inhibitor of behavior. It responds to nonreward, punishment and 
uncertainty. The Behavioral Facilitatory System (BFS) is action without restraint (examples: extraversion, sexual 
behavior, aggressive behavior) and mobilizes behavior so that active engagement occurs. Quay's Hypothesis is that 
severe and persistent undersocialized conduct disorder has its biological foundations in an imbalance between the 
BIS mediated by NE and serotonergic neuronal pathways and BFS mediated by dopaminergic pathways.8    
 NE is thought to play an important role in the modulation of behavior and even in the internalization of 
values (Rogeness, et al., 1992). The central NE system is one of the first neurotransmitter systems to develop and 
so may be especially vulnerable during early life (Coyle, 1987). The relative strength of the BFS (dopaminergic 
system) and BIS (NE/serotonergic systems) would theoretically influence this process over time and behavior at a 
given point in time. BALANCE is the key word (Quay et al, 1987; Quay, 1988; Rogeness et al., 1992).    
  
                           NEUROTRANSMITTER RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 Studies have implicated the NE system with data consistent with decreased NE activity being associated 
with an increase in conduct symptoms. The biologic data (decreased sympathetic tone or responsiveness as 
measured by skin conductance and resting heart rate and measures of NE metabolism in Conduct Disorder) are 
consistent with decreased NE activity being associated with some forms of Conduct Disorder. Decreased NE 
activity is consistent with the model of subjects with Conduct Disorder conditioning less well to signals of 
punishment and therefore being more likely to have deficits in internalization of societal rules (Rogeness, 1994). 
  Some studies on serotonergic functions in adults reported at the end of the last decade have had follow-up 
or drawn support from newly designed studies in 1996. Coccaro and his associates had evaluated central 5HT 
functions in relation to impulsive aggressive behavior in adults. Following a single dose challenge with 
fenfluramine, a serotonin releasing/uptake inhibiting agent, prolactin responses were measured as a “promising 
index of overall central serotonergic activity".Their results suggested that self- and other- directed impulsive, 
aggressive behaviors in patients with personality disorders were associated with reduced central serotonergic 
function (Coccaro,et al., 1989). In their new study they examined the relationship between binding parameters of 
the platelet central serotonin transporter and measures of aggression and impulsivity in adults.9
  Several studies in children and adolescents have been consistent with adult studies and an association 
between decreased serotonergic function and Conduct Disorder (Rogeness, 1994). When selective serotonergic 
agents have been used clinically to treat aggression, their effects have appeared acutely in contrast to their 
antidepressant and anxiolytic actions. This has suggested that the therapeutic anti-aggressive effects may be related 
 They concluded 
that this might represent another abnormality in serotonergic function in individuals with personality disorder and 
aggressive behavior (Coccaro, 1996). Virkunnen and associates (1989) had correlated recidivism in adult 
firesetters and violent offenders with the biological variables of lower serotonin metabolites in cerebrospinal fluid. 
In their 1996 report on alcoholic violent offenders and fire setters, Virkunnen et al. confirmed their earlier findings 
of low metabolites in recidivists vs. non-recidivists. They also found that the recidivists' developmental histories 
were remarkable for paternal absence from and presence of brothers in the home. 
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to the acute activation of serotonergic receptors rather than to the down-regulatory changes that appear after long 
term treatments (Zubieta and Alessi, 1993). However, actual studies of dopamine and its metabolite thus far have 
not demonstrated a difference in subjects with and without conduct disorder (Rogeness, 1994).         
  The much sought after heritable factor(s) for sociopathy already 
recognized as interactive with adverse environmental conditions, may soon 
be identified (CHROMOSOME 11: D4DR, regulating dopamine, has been 
proposed as the link to novelty seeking; LL FORM 5HT1Db, serotonin 
receptor gene, to aggressiveness) but, we doubt it (or they) will provide a 
completely satisfying explanation for sociopathy, because the same heritable 
factor(s) may be, like other dimensions of temperament, susceptible of 
moralization, contributing to the contours of conscience in the novelty 
seeking or impulsive individual a proclivity  to engage in the moral 
adventure, sometimes impetuously, sometimes courageously (cf. Putman, 
1997). On the other hand there are identifiable adversities such as 
maltreatment that may lead to demoralization in the sense of an impaired 
ability to sustain the development and functioning of the organic unity that 
we call conscience.  
 
      
 
         
           THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF MALTREATMENT 
 
 Interactive stress responsive systems. Since maltreatment involves acute and/or enduring psychosocial 
stressors (termed Type I and/or Type II trauma, Terr, 1991), a knowledge of interactive stress responsive systems 
in a developmental context is essential in guiding the study of neurobiologic sequelae.   One theoretical account of 
the consequences of maltreatment in humans is that abusive, neglectful experiences contribute to intrinsic 
neuropsychiatric vulnerabilities that predispose the child to behavioral problems inviting more caregiver frustration 
and more abuse (Lewis et al., 1988; Lewis, 1992; 1994). The interactive stress responsive systems (Chrousos and 
Gold, 1992) likely to be involved in maltreatment include neurotransmitter and neuroendocrine (hypothalamic- 
pituitary- adrenal, - thyroid, -growth hormone and - gonadal axes) as well as the immune systems. 
  Laboratory animal studies have identified receptor changes associated with prolonged exposure to 
glucocorticoids released in response to stress (Sapolsky, Krey & McEwen, 1985).  Naturalistic studies of primates 
subordinated in their social hierarchy have demonstrated endocrine alterations (Sapolsky, 1982; 1989) as well as 
hippocampal damage (Uno, Tarara, Else, Suleman and Sapolsky, 1990). There is also evidence pertinent to neglect 
derived from animal models. Nonhuman primates who have experienced abnormal rearing practices have 
consistently demonstrated emotional and social impairments (Harlow, Doddsworth & Harlow, 1965; Harlow, 1980; 
Suomi, 1985; 1991).With regard to biologic sequelae, animal research has demonstrated impairments in the 
central noradrenergic system. For example, mother-deprived rhesus infants were found to have lower levels of 
cerebral spinal fluid NE than mother reared infants (Kraemer, Ebert, Lake, and Mckinney, 1984; Kraemer, Ebert, 
Schmidt, & McKinney, 1989).  
 Recall that the latter three character dimensions in Cloninger's model involve conceptual learning which 
is conscious and abstractly symbolic (cf. explicit or narrative memories that can be intentionally retrieved). 
Hippocampal processing and long-term storage in association cortex appear essential. Lesion studies in humans 
and other primates show that conceptual information is processed and stored in a cortico-limbic-diencephalic 
system including: 
 
  1. higher order sensory areas of the cortex 
  2. the entorhinal cortex 
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  3. the amygdala 
  4. hippocampal formation. 
  5. the medial thalamic nuclei  
  6. ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
  7. basal forebrain (Cloninger, 1993). 
 
  On the other hand in taking the perspective that conscience is moralized consciousness, one is 
obliged to return to model of proto-self, core consciousness and extended consciousness, of which  conscience is 
conceived as a  refinement (Damasio, 1999).The neuroanatomy hypothesized as underlying the processes behind 
the proto-self (and object) includes brainstem nuclei, the hypothalamus and certain somatosensory cortices. 
Underlying core-consciousness, the cingulate cortices, the thalamus and the superior colliculi are likely suspects 
(1999, pp. 193-194). Based upon lesion studies, Damasio indicates hippocampus and amydalae are not implicated 
in core-consciousness. Nor are the ventromedial or dorsolateral aspects of the prefrontal cortex. When it comes to 
extended consciousness, however, there are implicated several higher order cortices including parts of limbic 
cortices and numerous subcortical nuclei, including the amygdalae, that hold dispositions and are potentially 
contributory (1999, p.333).  
 While the role of the hippocampus may be negligible in supporting core consciousness, as Damasio argues 
persuasively (1999, pp. 270 and 333), its role in extended consciousness can not be dismissed. The amygdala, 
considered important in aspects of prosocial development related to empathic responsiveness (Brothers, 1989), may 
share with the hippocampus and other brain structures and pathways vulnerability to maltreatment effects mediated 
by intense or prolonged stress responses. Theoretically, neurobiologic sequelae of maltreatment may involve 
alterations in receptor numbers, morphological changes in the neuron, modification of the processes of 
synaptogenesis and synaptic pruning and even neuronal death. Some forms of psychopathology have been 
attributed to learning gone awry. For example, Kandel (1983) proposed a molecular explanation for chronic 
anxiety involving structural changes in the number and distribution of synaptic vesicles as well as the size and 
extent of their active zones. He argued that the acquisition of chronic anxiety is a learned process that creates 
morphological changes (demonstrated in the animal model) altering the functional expression of neural 
connections. Furthermore, it was proposed that such learning is likely to involve enduring, self-maintaining 
alterations in gene expressions. More directly relevant to maltreatment, Kandel proposed similar alterations when 
maltreatment occurs during developmentally critical periods (Kandel, 1985). 
 Consideration of neurobiologic processes in adult PTSD implicates similar processes in childhood 
maltreatment. Strong evidence suggests that noradrenergic (NE), dopaminergic, opiate and 
Hypothalamic-Adrenal-Pituitary (HPA) neuronal systems and the locus coeruleus (LC), amygdala, hypothalamus, 
hippocampus and prefrontal cortex are involved in PTSD. Moreover, sophisticated gene-environment interactions 
are implicated in proposals to account for symptoms associated with chronic PTSD (Charney, Deutch, Krystal, 
Southwick, 1993).  
 In a similar vein, Post (1992) proposed a detailed mechanism of how psychosocial stress associated with 
initial episodes of affective disorder may sensitize an individual to further episodes, some of which may occur 
spontaneously. The initial experience kindles neurobiological changes encoded at the level of gene expression. 
Neuronal transmission sets into motion intracellular changes at the level of gene transcription; transcription factors 
(e.g. proto- oncogene, c-fos) bind at DNA sites and induce mRNAs for other substances exerting even longer range 
effects. Enduring changes in neurotransmitters, receptors and peptides may be the biochemical and anatomical 
basis for synaptic adaptations and memory that can last indefinitely.  
 Depression, or Conduct Disorder illuminates- but only indirectly-the neurobiology of maltreatment. For 
more direct illumination it is necessary to apply our knowledge of the developmental neurobiological factors 
involved in learning and in stress responses to the variables of maltreatment because maltreatment involves 
both adverse learning processes and psychosocial stressors at the extreme of caregiver casualty. For a 
comprehensive review of the state of the field including animal models of uncontrolled and unpredictable stress, 
the implications of studies in adult PTSD and the few direct investigations into the neurobiology (or 
psychobiology) of maltreatment, see De Bellis and Putnam (1994) who note that the specificities, if any, of 
different forms (character) of maltreatment for various neurobiologic systems remain to be explored. Perry and 
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Pollard (1998) have provided a more recent review of traumatic stress effects on neurodevelopment in children, 
emphasizing that trauma induces a total brain response, and that children’s developing brains are more vulnerable 
to trauma than adults. Whereas traumatic events modify an adult’s original state of homeostasis and organization, 
in children, these same events become the original organizing experience itself.  
 Psychobiologic study according to the maltreatment variable, character: Abnormal cortisol levels have 
been found in sexually abused girls, implicating altered glucocorticoid functions in the hypothalamic pituitary 
adrenal axis (HPA), (Putnam, Trickett, Helmers, Susman, Dorn, and Everett, 1991). Plasma Adrenocorticotrophic 
Hormone response to ovine corticotropin- releasing hormone is reduced in sexually abused girls compared with 
control subjects (De Bellis, Chrousos, Dorn, Burke, Helmers, Kling, Trickett & Putnam, 1994).   Corticotropin-
releasing hormone and locus coeruleus-NE/ Sympathetic systems participate in a positive reverberatory feedback 
loop (Chrousos and Gold, 1992), hence alterations in NE functioning might also be anticipated in sexually abused 
girls. Findings support the idea that sexually abused girls have higher catecholamine functional activity compared 
to controls (De Bellis, Lefter, Trickett, & Putnam, 1994). In a study of emotionally disturbed children (Rogeness, 
1991), subjects with a history of neglect plus abuse, compared to subjects without maltreatment were found to have 
lower urinary NE. 
 Psychobiologic study according to the maltreatment variable, age at onset: NE is converted from 
dopamine by the enzyme Dopamine-beta-hydroxylase (DßH). In fact DßH is used in immunohistochemical studies 
to locate NE neurons (Charlton, McGadey, Russell, and Neal, 1992; Ginsberg, Hof, Young, and Morrison, 1993).  
Serum DßH has properties making it a possible marker of early abuse/neglect effects on the NE system (Galvin, 
Shekhar, Simon, Stilwell, Ten Eyck, Laite, Karwisch and Blix, 1991; Galvin, Ten Eyck, Shekhar, Stilwell, 
Fineberg, Laite and Karwisch, 1995). Serum DßH activity increases particularly in the first 24-36 months of life 
with little further increase after 72months of life (Weinshilboum, Raymond, Elveback and Weidman, 1973; 
Weinshilboum & Axelrod, 1971; Freedman, Ohuchi, Goldstein, Axelrod, Fish and Dancir, 1972). Environmental 
adversity occurring at an early age when the DßH enzyme activity is unstable (indicative of vulnerability in the NE 
system) may have quite different effects than environmental adversity later in life. In psychiatrically hospitalized 
boys there were no differences in DßH activity between maltreated (defined as neglected, physically abused or 
sexually abused) and nonmaltreated groups-provided age at onset of maltreatment was not considered; however, 
when age at onset of maltreatment was taken into account group differences were discerned. The group of boys 
who had been subjected to maltreatment before 72 months of age had lower serum DßH than groups of boys who 
had been subjected to maltreatment later on or had not been subjected to maltreatment.   Interestingly among boys 
who were diagnosed with Conduct Disorder Solitary Aggressive type  (CDSA) those who were not maltreated at an 
early age had even lower DßH activity than those who were maltreated at an early age who, in turn, were  lower in 
DßH activity  than boys  neither maltreated nor diagnosed with CDSA. Analogously to Post's model of the 
transduction of stress into depression, it was hypothesized that genetically determined DßH activity might be 
modulated by prolonged exposure to glucocorticoids released as part of the stress response.  (Galvin et al., 1991, 
1995).  
 
                     TOWARDS THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CONSCIENCE 
  
 Consequently, while low serum DßH is implicated as a neurobiologic marker for the transduction 
of stress associated with early maltreatment into CDSA, studies to date by no means settle the matter 
conclusively. Low serum DßH could instead be a biological marker for a genetic trait or maturational delay 
associated with vulnerabilities to develop CDSA provided other environmentally adverse conditions such as 
extremes of caregiver casualty obtain. In any event, low DßH may mark a psychobiologic trait, either 
heritable or associated with maturational delay or the sequelae of maltreatment that comprises the 
underlying biotype for a phenotype of externalization and impulsiveness. The child may then fail to 
modulate impulses by internal controls and fail to evince moral emotional responses such as guilt and 
remorse that have become overvalued by the caregiver(s). The caregiver, in spite of over determined 
valuation of certain kinds of moral emotional responses from their child, may nonetheless share more or 
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less the same biotype and phenotype with the child and so be subject generally to low frustration tolerance 
and lack of internalized control. These caregiver traits interact with inappropriate developmental 
expectations of the child thereby compromising the stage salient tasks of parenting, and move the caregiver 
to extremes along the continuum of casualty. Depending on the critical period of development the child is 
in, stressful interactions with the caregiver may further alter the child's biotype in a way contributing to 
developmental psychopathology identified on Axis I and/or Axis II. Further studies are required that are 
sensitive to gender effects, are based on carefully ascertained cases of maltreatment, are well characterized 
and contradistinguished in regards to important variables of the maltreatment experience, and are controlled 
for confounding diagnoses such as conduct disorder as well as factors such as loss, poverty and exposure to 
urban violence, which in themselves constitute prolonged stressors likely to have as yet poorly understood 
psychobiologic sequelae. There will likely be additional implications of a multiaxial approach to sequelae 
of maltreatment for the psychobiology of conscience as neuroimaging and assessment of conscience 
functions in health and psychopathology become more refined.          
 What has been emphasized elsewhere (Galvin et al., 1997) bears repetition: conscience functioning 
is not confined to behavioral inhibition.  Moral-emotional responsiveness requires behavioral action and 
commitment in the processes of reparation and healing as well as prosocial behavior. The domains of moral 
self valuation and moral volition are related to the maintenance of self-esteem and the developmental 
progression from autonomy to moral agency.  These conscience functions will likely be found to depend 
upon neuromodulation different from that involved in behavioral inhibition.  In any event, it will be 
surprising indeed if the complexities of conscience are not matched in complexity by its psychobiological 
basis. 
 The brain insult visited by maltreatment is not so readily apparent as the injury sustained by 
Phineas Gage when a railroad spike, transformed into a missile by an accidental explosion, penetrated his 
frontal lobes (Damasio, 1994). Nonetheless, each child who has endured early maltreatment and 
demonstrates delay or psychopathologic interference in moral development may have hidden bruises or 
scars in the form of neurobiologic markers. Maltreated children elicit our empathic responses and, if we are 
concerned citizens, motivate us to protect victims and support prevention programs, if we are in the healing 
professions, to dedicate ourselves to their care and recovery.  Yet each maltreated child may also be a 
modern day Phineas Gage from whom we have much to learn, allowing us to make sense of their 
neurobiological markers in terms of the psychobiology of conscience, the heart of the human personality.  
 
 Summary. The sequelae of maltreatment have been conceptualized according to the DSM IV multiaxial 
system expanded for heuristic purposes.  Axis I and Axis IV were expanded to take into account important 
variables of maltreatment. The differential Axis I diagnoses were identified with special emphasis placed on 
PTSD, Dissociation, Depression and Disruptive Behavior Disorders.  Axes II and III were heuristically 
expanded to call attention to development and developmental psychopathology, particularly in the domains 
of conscience, and associated putative neurobiological sequelae of maltreatment, indicating a pathway to 
the psychobiology of conscience. Conscience sensitive assessment of maltreated children was illustrated 
with two case vignettes and selected conscience drawings. A trans-axial, conscience sensitive approach to 
DSM has been proposed as a corrective. There will likely be additional implications of the study of 
maltreatment for a more general psychobiology of conscience as neuroimaging and assessment of 
conscience functions in health and psychopathology become more refined.   
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ENDNOTES 
  
1 This unpublished manuscript presents the results of a study led by Kelda Harris Walsh, M.D. while completing 
her child psychiatry fellowship at I.U., under the supervision of her co-author MG. This pilot study suggests that 
specific items culled from a widely used dimensional rating scale of psychopathology and configured according to 
the domains of conscience are sensitive to the effects of one or more maltreatment variables while broadband and 
narrow band scores, apparently, are not. It remains to be rigorously determined whether the effects discerned in 
this way are also to be found in conditions and disorders other than those associated with maltreatment. The paper 
was submitted for anonymous peer-review to Child Abuse and Neglect in 1999. Concerned with the complex and 
highly conceptual nature of the material, the focus upon psychiatric inpatients (making generalization 
problematic), as well as the small sample size, the reviewer recommended and encouraged that the material be 
presented in a concept paper with data support rather than with statistical testing. In the spirit of the reviewer’s 
recommendation and consideration of the contribution to the field that Walsh et al. have made, their study, qua 
pilot data, is adduced as support for concepts in the current work and described in more than the customary detail. 
For interested readers, the methods and statistics that were applied in the study are described as follows. 
 After application of exclusion criteria, the subjects were 54 adolescents (28 boys, 26 girls) consecutively 
admitted to a small, acute psychiatric inpatient unit at a university teaching hospital between spring 1991 and 
spring 1993.  Psychiatric diagnoses were made clinically, according to DSM III-R (APA, 1987) criteria. Discharge 
diagnoses are reported. Patients with diagnoses of pervasive developmental disorders, schizophrenias, mental 
retardation and organic brain syndromes were excluded. Admission evaluations were conducted by a psychiatry 
resident and social worker directly supervised by one of the authors (MG) who required maltreatment histories be 
routinely obtained as part of the psychiatric evaluation. MG also conducted a psychiatric interview.  
 At a minimum, maltreatment was characterized clinically in terms of kind (sexual abuse, physical abuse 
and/or neglect), age at onset, duration, relationship of the victim to the perpetrator, and the number of perpetrators. 
Reviews of completed psychiatric evaluations were conducted independently by MG and three raters (a nurse 
practitioner, an ACSW and a child psychiatry resident: see acknowledgments) who utilized a screen for 
maltreatment described in previous studies (Galvin, et al, 1995; Galvin et al, 1997).  Scores for inter-rater 
agreement (Winer, 1971) among the four reviewers of ten randomly selected cases were calculated for the 
following fields of the maltreatment data base: degree of certainty about maltreatment: definite abuse (0.88), 
possible abuse (0.91), abandonment and definite neglect (1.00), possible neglect (0.84); kind of abuse: physical 
abuse (0.97), sexual abuse (0.97); continuum of caregiver casualty: harsh discipline (0.72), inadequate discipline 
(0.62), prolonged separation (0.71); age at onset of maltreatment: on or before 36 months (almost 100% 
agreement), after 36 months (0.87).  A third group became evident and our hypotheses regarding psychobiologic 
sequelae of maltreatment further evolved (Galvin, et al., 1995) as we were conducting this study. In subsequent 
analysis of the data, an additional division of age at onset was made: between 36 months and 72 months and on or 
after 72 months, yielding four maltreatment groups altogether: early, middle, late and none.  
 Statistical Analysis was conducted with SAS version 6.12 (1990). ANOVA, Wilcoxen 2 sample tests T 
test and Mann-Whitney Tests were used for Hypothesis 1. Pearson and Spearman Correlations were used for 
Hypothesis 2.Cronbach’s Coefficient Alpha was used to test internal consistency of the items rationally selected 
from the Achenbach CBCL and YSR and configured according to the Conscience Domains. Hypotheses 3 and 4 
were examined in two ways: with Friedman’s Chi Square test (two way analysis of variance of ranks) and Mann-
Whitney Tests. 
  
 
 
2. The counter-argument marshaled produces the effect that neither theoreticians nor clinicians should be wholly 
uncritical of the notion of developmentally critical-or sensitive- periods. “The allure of infant determinism” is 
second among the ideological currents in developmental psychology targeted by Kagan in his book Three 
Seductive Ideas. The author disputes “…that experiences during the child’s early years (especially the biological 
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mother’s affectionate care and interactive play with her infant) are the most potent force in shaping a life.”(p.83). 
He proceeds to a critical review of Attachment research methodology (the Strange Situation) and interpretation of 
findings therefrom, particularly the theoretical construct designated by the term “working model.” (p.102ff). Just to 
the extent this aspect of attachment theory is affirmed, it shapes the interpretation of constructed relational 
meanings of all sorts, whether these meanings are called worldview, moral meaning or conceptualization of 
conscience (apropos our preceding comments regarding sense of violation and moral meaning making). Kagan is 
concerned to dispute expectations that nurture or neglect and conditioned emotional reactions established early in 
life are sustained in the absence of the conditions which led to them in the first place. On the view he promotes, 
much does hinge upon the interpretation of experience but that interpretive capacity attends development into the 
third and fourth years of life (p.116).  
 In a related point, the demonstration of biological markers of maltreatment occurring at particular periods 
of development is only a small first step in a process that must also demonstrate correlations with functional 
categories subsumed by the varieties of consciousness, including conscience. Apropos this point, Kagan writes: 
“…Consciousness is best described as a set of emergent phenomena that require brain processes but are not 
equivalent to them…” (p.40). While very intriguing speculations regarding functions abound, they are nonetheless 
speculations awaiting specific arguments posed in terms of agents, targets and contexts susceptible of empirical 
validation. (p.82).  
 Interpretations of our studies (with respect to psychiatrically hospitalized, seriously and persistently ill 
boys) include:  
1)  Severe maltreatment experiences at an early age putatively correlate with a severe kind of conduct 
disorder.  
2)  Severe maltreatment experiences occurring at an early age (before the child’s development of 
interpretive capacities) putatively correlate with delays and pathological interference in conscience 
functions and  
3)  Severe maltreatment experiences occurring at an early age putatively correlate with a biological 
marker;  
The word “putative” is used to reflect that the findings have not been replicated and that they may be criticized 
from the standpoint of methodological difficulties. For example, applying aspects of Kagan’s critique, the child’s 
or adolescent’s retrospective interpretation of maltreatment was not adequately characterized.  
The causal relationships among our three putative findings are matters of speculation, but, we hope, not 
idle speculation. “Not idle” because, irrespective of whether the findings of our (or similar) studies prove true or 
untrue, the invitation to this speculative activity promotes a habit of conceptualizing multiaxial diagnosis, fully and 
meaningfully. 
  
3. But, for cautionary comments, cf. Kagan, 1998 who devotes pp.112-150 in Three Seductive Ideas to the subject 
of the child’s interpretation of experience. 
 
 
4.  Cloninger et al (1993) note that five factors, plus or minus two, account for most variation in personality 
between individuals in the general population. Two factors, neuroticism vs. stability and extraversion vs. 
introversion are consistently described in the literature. There is less consistency about the third factor, variously 
identified as tough-mindedness, constraint and openness to experience. In a popular five-factor model, two 
additional factors are conscientiousness and agreeableness. Second, they argue that the five-factor model does not 
capture some domains of personality such as individual autonomy, traditional moral values, and other aspects of 
maturity and self-actualization described in humanistic and transpersonal psychology. 
 
5.  Using Pearson and Spearman Correlations to check the linear tendency of CBCL and YSR broadband and sub-
scale scores, it was found in the MPG that there was either no correlation or, in the case of the sub-scale “thought 
problems” a negative correlation (-0.85 by Pearson Correlation Coefficient), between the adolescent’s self report 
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and the maltreating parent’s report.  The difference between groups with respect to correlations of CBCL and YSR 
“thought problems” was significant (p= 0.04). Of interest as an exploratory finding was the negative correlation of 
CBCL “thought problems” with 5 of the 6 YSR internalizing sub-scales. In the CPG, on the other hand, there were 
positive correlations in the externalizing broadband and both externalizing sub-scales, “delinquency” and 
“aggression” and also a cross correlation between CBCL “aggression” and YSR “delinquency.” There were no 
correlations among the internalizing sub-scales except for positive correlations between the adolescent and the 
parent on the “somatic” sub-scale. 
 
6. A more complete historical account might begin with Cleckley. Cleckley formulated the essential features of and 
popularized the term for psychopathy in The Mask of Sanity (1964). Cleckley characterized psychopathy (now 
referred to as sociopathy or antisocial personality disorder) as inability to learn from experience and engaging in 
antisocial behavior attributable, in part, to a hypothesized underlying deficit. A considerable portion of the 
literature on psychopathy has attempted to delineate the hypothesized underlying deficit with an emphasis on 
deficient anxiety conditioning in anticipation of punishment and on poor passive avoidance (learning not to make a 
response that will be punished). Hypoactive electrodermal skin response (the current term for galvanic skin 
response-GSR- or skin conductance) has been taken as an index of poor anxiety conditioning and the passive 
avoidance deficit has been viewed as a laboratory analog of impulsivity seen clinically (Fowles & Missel, 1994). 
 Lykkens' 1957 study on psychopathology in adults involved three groups: psychopathic criminals, neurotic 
criminals, and noncriminals. Subjects were set a task, a mental maze, with choice points at which the subject chose 
to press one of four levers. Only one choice was correct. The manifest task was to complete the mental maze with 
as few errors as possible. In addition, one of the three incorrect levers, when pressed, resulted in an electric shock. 
So the latent task was to avoid those particular errors that entailed painful consequences. There was no difference 
between groups in their ability to learn the manifest task, however, psychopaths exhibited no improvement in the 
ratio of shocked to unshocked errors while the others were able to reduce this proportion (reviewed in Gorenstein 
& Newman, 1980, Fowles 1987, Fowles and Missel, 1994).   
 Hare (reviewed by Gorenstein and Newman, 1980, and by Mednick, 1981) Trasler and others (cited by 
Mednick, 1981) discussed the possibility that the psychopath and criminal have some defect in avoidance learning 
which interferes with their ability to learn to inhibit asocial responses. Hare suggested that this was autonomic 
hyporeactivity. Hare's subjects were grouped in the same way as those of Lykkens. Subjects were set the task of 
observing the numbers 1-12 appearing through the window of a memory drum. In the second trial, subjects were 
told a shock would be delivered each time the number 8 appeared. Skin conductance was monitored. In the 
psychopathic group, but not in comparison groups, the skin conductance did not rise until the number 8 was 
imminent. This phenomenon was called a steep temporal gradient of fear arousal and appeared to be a deficit in 
classical conditioning involving the failure of early temporal cues (Conditioned Stimulus) to elicit an emotional 
response (Conditioned Response) even when the cues were reliable predictors of a subsequent aversive event.  
 
7.  Damasio gives a more sophisticated view in line with recent developments in neuroscience. In Descartes Error, 
Damasio (1994) argues that we rely upon somatic markers to make judgements. These markers are acquired by 
experience, under the control of an internal preference system (consisting of mostly innate regulatory dispositions, 
posed to ensure survival of the organism, inherently biased to avoid pain, to seek potential pleasure and, moreover, 
to achieve these goals in social situations) and under the influence of an external set of circumstances which 
include not only entities and events with which the organism must interact but also social conventions and ethical 
rules. The critical formative set of stimuli to somatic pairings is acquired in childhood and adolescence but the 
accrual of somatically marked stimuli ceases only when life ceases. In what sounds a little like Mednick's biosocial 
learning of morality, only not restricted to the emotion of fear, Damasio (1994) writes: 
 
When the choice of option X, which leads to bad outcome Y, is followed by punishment and thus painful 
body states, the somatic marker system acquires the hidden, dispositional representation of this experience 
driven, non inherited, arbitrary connection. Reexposure to option X, or thoughts about outcome Y will 
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have now the power to reenact the painful body state and thus serve as an automated reminder of the bad 
consequences to come. 
 
8. Important areas of central NE activity are the locus coeruleus, the lateral tegmental areas and (along with 
serotonin) the Papez Loop, identified as part of the BIS in Quay's Hypothesis (Quay, Routh, Shapiro, 1987; Quay, 
1988). Components of the BFS are thought to be integrated in the mesolimbic dopamine system. 
 
 
9. In Cloninger's model the temperamental dimensions are postulated to be genetically independent of one another 
and defined in terms of individual differences in associative learning in response to novelty, danger or punishment 
and reward. Persistence shares with these temperamental dimensions the essential feature of involving automatic, 
preconceptual responses to perceptual stimuli (cf. associative learning, unconscious habits, and implicit or 
procedural memory), presumably reflecting heritable biases in information processing by the perceptual memory 
system. This involves the cortical-striatal system including the sensory cortical areas and the caudate and putamen; 
but hippocampal processing is not required. Examined more closely, novelty seeking is viewed as the heritable 
bias in the activation or initiation of behaviors such as frequent exploratory activity in response to novelty, 
impulsive decision making, extravagance in approach to cues for rewards, and quick loss of temper and active 
avoidance of frustration. The relationship to Fowles' appetitive motivational system and Gray's/Quay's BAS is 
readily apparent. Harm avoidance is viewed as a heritable bias in the inhibition or cessation of behaviors, such as 
pessimistic worry in anticipation of future problems, passive avoidant behaviors such as fear of uncertainty and 
shyness of strangers and rapid fatigability. Again, the relationship to Fowles' aversive motivational system and 
Gray's/Quay's BIS is readily apparent. Someone with ASPD then has the following stimulus response 
characteristics: high in novelty seeking (implicating dopamine), low in harm avoidance (implicating serotonin) 
and low in reward dependence (implicating NE) (Cloninger, 1987). 
 
10. They measured the maximal number of platelet tritiated paroxetine binding sites and dissociation constant 
values in 24 patients with personality disorder and 12 healthy volunteers.  In patients with personality disorder but 
not healthy volunteers, measures of aggression and impulsivity were inversely correlated with the maximal number 
of platelet tritiated paroxetine binding sites but not the dissociation constant. 
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